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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
V.

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and, AT FITNESS, LLC,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2016-1618
Docket No.

46027

_ _ _ _ _ _D_e_u_en_d_an_t/R_e_s..._p_on_d_e_nt_._ )

**************
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

**************
Appeal from the District Court of the
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Bonneville
HONORABLE DANE H. WATKINS, District Judge.

**************
Allen Browning

Jeffrey A. Thomson and Joseph F. Southers

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent
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Case: CV-2016-0001618-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, etal.

Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, Anytime Fitness, AT Fitness, LLC
Date

Code

User

3/24/2016

SMIS

HUMPHREY

Summons Issued

Dane H Watkins Jr

NCOC

HUMPHREY

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOAP

HUMPHREY

Plaintiff: Nelson, Amey J Notice Of Appearance
Allen H. Browning

Dane H Watkins Jr

HUMPHREY

Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District
Dane H Watkins Jr
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and
H(1) Paid by: Browning Law Receipt number:
0012784 Dated: 3/25/2016 Amount: $221.00
(Check) For: Nelson, Amey J (plaintiff)

COMP

HUMPHREY

Verified Complaint Filed For Damages And
Demand For Jury Trial

4/5/2016

ASRV

JNICHOLS

Affidavit of Service Agent) 04/04/2016

5/2/2016

NOAP

JNICHOLS

Defendant: AT Fitness, LLC Notice Of
Appearance Dina L Sallak

Dane H Watkins Jr

JNICHOLS

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Carey
Perkins LLP Receipt number: 0018662 Dated:
5/3/2016 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: AT
Fitness, LLC (defendant)

Dane H Watkins Jr

ANSW

JNICHOLS

AT Fitness, LLC's Answer To Complaint For
Damages And Demand For Jury Trial

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

TCORONA

Motion To Extend Time For Service Of Plaintiff's
Complaint And Summons

Dane H Watkins Jr

APPL
AFFD

TCORONA
TCORONA

Application For Service by Publication

Dane H Watkins Jr

TCORONA

At Fitness, LLC's Non-Opposition To Plaintiff's
Motion to Extend Time For Service And
Application For Service By Publication

Dane H Watkins Jr

CEARLY
CARTER
BJENNINGS
CEARLY

Order For Service By Publication

Dane H Watkins Jr

Summons Issued - Publication

Dane H Watkins Jr

Summons Issued - Stefani Kaufman

Dane H Watkins Jr

9/21/2016

ORDR
SMIS
SMIS
ORDR

Order To Extend Time For Service Of Plaintiff's
Complaint And Summons

Dane H Watkins Jr

11/8/2016

PPUB

BJENNINGS

Proof Of Publication - Stefan Kaufman - October
13, 20, 27, and November 3, 2016

Dane H Watkins Jr

12/28/2016

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
02/02/2017 08:30 AM)

Dane H Watkins Jr

8/31/2016

9/1/2016

9/13/2016
9/19/2016

CARTER

Judge

Dane H Watkins Jr

Dean Mortimer (Registered Dane H Watkins Jr

Affidavit In Support Of Application For Service by Dane H Watkins Jr
Publication

Notice of Hearing

Dane H Watkins Jr
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Case: CV-2016-0001618-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, etal.

Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, Anytime Fitness, AT Fitness, LLC
Date

Code

User

2/2/2017

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 2/2/2017
Time: 8:48 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: Amey Nelson, Attorney: Allen Browning
Party: AT Fitness, LLC, Attorney: Dina Sallak

Dane H Watkins Jr

DCHH

CARTER

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference
scheduled on 02/02/2017 08:30 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
10/18/2017 08:30 AM)

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

CARTER

ORDR
MOTN

CARTER

Order Setting Trial and PreTrial Conference

TCORONA

At Fitness, LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

TCORONA

Affidavit OfTayson Webb In Support Of At
Fitness, LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

MEMO

TCORONA

Memorandum Of Law In Support Of At Fitness,
LLC's Motion For Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

4/20/2017

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/22/2017 09:00
AM) AT FITNESS - Mtn for Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

4/21/2017

NTOS

ALINARES

NOTH

ALINARES

4/25/2017

NOTH

TCORONA

6/8/2017

AFFD

MOTN

BJENNINGS
TCORONA

Dane
Notice Of Service- Defendant AT Fitness, First
Set of Interrogatories and First Set of Request for
Production of Documents
Dane
Notice Of Hearing- 6/22/16 at 9 am- Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Dane
Amended Notice Of Hearing 06/22/17 @9:00
AM Motion For Summary Judgment
Dane
Affidavit of Amey J. Nelson

MEMO

2/3/2017
4/19/2017

6/15/2017

Judge

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/14/2017 10:00 Dane H Watkins Jr

AM)
Dane H Watkins Jr

H Watkins Jr

H Watkins Jr
H Watkins Jr
H Watkins Jr

Plaintiff's Motion To Strike Unverified Statement
Of Stefani Kaufman

Dane H Watkins Jr

TCORONA

Plaintiff's Memorandum In Opposition To
Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTC

TCORONA

Notice Of Attorney Name Change Dina L
Sallak-Windes

Dane H Watkins Jr

RESP

TCORONA

Reply In Support At Fitness, LLC's Motion For
Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr
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Case: CV-2016-0001618-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, etal.

Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, Anytime Fitness, AT Fitness, LLC
Date

Code

User

6/22/2017

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 6/22/2017
Time: 9:01 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: Amey Nelson, Attorney: Allen Browning
Party: AT Fitness, LLC, Attorney: Dina
Sallak-Windes

DCHH

CARTER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Dane H Watkins Jr
06/22/2017 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: AT FITNESS - Mtn for Summary
Judgment

6/27/2017

NTOS

BJENNINGS

Plaintiff's Notice of Service - Plaintiff's Answers to Dane H Watkins Jr
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and
Requests for Production

7/7/2017

MEMO

CARTER

Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion for Dane H Watkins Jr
Summary Judgment

7/12/2017

NOTC

ALINARES

Notice of Intent To Default

7/14/2017

BJENNINGS

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
Dane H Watkins Jr
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Kaufman,
Stefani (defendant) Receipt number: 0032662
Dated: 7/18/2017 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For:
Kaufman, Stefani (defendant)

7/17/2017

CPETERSON

Plaintiff's Expert Witness Disclosure

Dane H Watkins Jr

Judge
Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H Watkins Jr

7/18/2017

NOAP

BJENNINGS

Defendant: Kaufman, Stefani Notice Of
Appearance Jeffrey Thomson

Dane H Watkins Jr

7/28/2017

STIP

ALINARES

Stipulation For Dismissal, With Prejudice

Dane H Watkins Jr

ANSW

CPETERSON

Defendant Stefani Kaufman's Answer to
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

Dane H Watkins Jr

STIP

ALINARES

Stipulation To Vacate Trial, Reschedule Trial And Dane H Watkins Jr

7/31/2017

Reschedule Deadlines

8/3/2017

NTOS

ALINARES

Notice Of Service of Discovery - Defendant's First Dane H Watkins Jr
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production to Plaintiff

ORDR

CARTER

Order of Dismissal, With Prejudice, of AT Fitness, Dane H Watkins Jr
LLC

JDMT

CARTER

Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

CARTER

Order Vacating Trial, Rescheduling Trial and

Dane H Watkins Jr

Rescheduling Deadlines
CDIS

CARTER

Civil Disposition entered for: Anytime Fitness,
Defendant; AT Fitness, LLC, Defendant; Nelson,
Amey J, Plaintiff. Filing date: 8/3/2017

Dane H Watkins Jr
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Case: CV-2016-0001618-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, etal.

Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, Anytime Fitness, AT Fitness, LLC
Date

Code

User

8/3/2017

HRVC

CARTER

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 10/18/2017 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRVC

CARTER

Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
11/14/201710:00AM: HearingVacated

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
09/06/2017 08:30 AM)

Dane H Watkins Jr

CARTER

Notice of Hearing

Dane H Watkins Jr

Judge

8/18/2017

MOTN

ALINARES

Defendant Stefani Kaufman's Motion To
Participate In Scheduling Conference By
Telephone

Dane H Watkins Jr

8/24/2017

ORDR

CARTER

Order Granting Motion to Participate in
Scheduling Conference by Telephone

Dane H Watkins Jr

8/30/2017

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/11/2017 09:00
AM) D - Mtn Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

9/6/2017

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 9/6/2017
Time: 8:43 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: Amey Nelson, Attorney: Allen Browning
Party: AT Fitness, LLC, Attorney: Dina
Sallak-Windes
Party: Stefani Kaufman, Attorney: Jeffrey
Thomson

Dane H Watkins Jr

DCHH

CARTER

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference
scheduled on 09/06/2017 08:30 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: AMy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
04/19/2018 08:30 AM)

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/15/2018 10:00 Dane H Watkins Jr
AM) 3 days

9/8/2017

ORDR

CARTER

2nd Order Setting Trial and Pretrial Conference

Dane H Watkins Jr

9/11/2017

MOTN

CPETERSON

Defendant Stefani Kaufman's Motion for
Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

MEMO

CPETERSON

Memorandum in Support of Defendant Stefani
Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

CPETERSON

AFFD

CPETERSON

Affidavit of Stefani Kaufman in Support of Motion Dane H Watkins Jr
for Summary Judgment
Dane H Watkins Jr
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment
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Case: CV-2016-0001618-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, etal.

Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, Anytime Fitness, AT Fitness, LLC
Date

Code

User

9/11/2017

NOTH

CPETERSON

Notice Of Hearing on Defendant Stefani
Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

10/2/2017

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/02/2017 09:00
AM)

Dane H Watkins Jr

CONT

CARTER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
10/11/2017 09:00 AM: Continued D - Mtn
Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

ALINARES

Amended Notice Of Hearing on Defendant
Stefani Kaufaman's Motion For Summary
Judgment - 11/22/2017 at 9:00 a.m.

Dane H Watkins Jr

BRIF

ALINARES

Plaintiff's Brief In Opposition To Defendant's
Motion For Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

ALINARES

Affidavit of Kaecee Reed

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

TCORONA

Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Defendant Dane H Watkins Jr
Stefani Kaufman's Motion to Strike the Exhibits to
the Affidavit of Kaecee Reed and Certain
Statements in Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment

MEMO

TCORONA

Dane H Watkins Jr
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Stefani
Kaufman's Motion to Strike the Exhibits to the
Affidavit of Kaecee Reed and Certain Statements
in Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment

RESP

TCORONA

Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant
Stefani Kaufman's Motion for Summary
Judgment

NOTH

TCORONA

Dane H Watkins Jr
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant Stefani
Kaufman's Motion to Strike the Exhibits to the
Affidavit of Kaecee Reed and Certain Statements
in Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment 11/02/17 @9:00 AM

MOTN

CARTER

Defendant Stefani Kaufmans Motion to Strike the Dane H Watkins Jr
Exhibits to the Affidavit of Kaecee Reed and
Certain Statements in Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition
to Motion for Summary Judgment

10/27/2017

AFFD

ALINARES

Second Affidavit of Kacee Reed

10/30/2017

MOTN

PADILLA

MEMO

PADILLA

Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Defendant Dane H Watkins Jr
Stefani Kaufman's Motion to Strike The Second
Affidavit of Kaecee Reed
Dane H Watkins Jr
Memorandum In Support of Defendant Stefani
Kaufman's Motion to Strike The Second Affidavit
of Kaecee Reed

NOTH

PADILLA

Notice Of Hearing On Defendant Stefani
Kaufman's Motion to Strike The Second Affidavit
of Kaecee Reed

MOTN

CARTER

Defendant Stefani Kaufman's Motion to Strike the Dane H Watkins Jr
Second Affidavit of Kaesee Reed

10/19/2017

10/26/2017

10/31/2017

Judge

Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H Watkins Jr
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Case: CV-2016-0001618-0C Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, etal.

Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, Anytime Fitness, AT Fitness, LLC
Date

Code

User

11/2/2017

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 11/2/2017
Time: 9:06 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: Amey Nelson, Attorney: Allen Browning
Party: Stefani Kaufman, Attorney: Jeffrey
Thomson

DCHH

CARTER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Dane H Watkins Jr
11/02/2017 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: D - Mtn Summary Judgment

MOTN

TCORONA

Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider

BRIF

TCORONA

Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider Dane H Watkins Jr

11/17/2017

Judge
Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H Watkins Jr

Filed
ORDR

CARTER

Order of Dismissal with Prejudice of Defendant
Stefani Kaufman

CDIS

CARTER

Civil Disposition entered for: Kaufman, Stefani,
Dane H Watkins Jr
Defendant; Nelson, Amey J, Plaintiff. Filing date:
11/28/2017

STATUS

CARTER

Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk
action

Dane H Watkins Jr

JDMT

Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jf

HRVC

CARTER
CARTER

HRVC

CARTER

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 04/19/2018 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

Dane H Watkins Jr

12/7/2017

MEMO

FREYJ

Memorandum in Response to Plaintiffs Brief in
Support of Motion to Reconsider

Dane H Watkins Jr

12/20/2017

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/28/2018 09:00
AM) Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

TCORONA

Notice Of Hearing
to Reconsider

ALINARES

Defendant's Request RE: Telephonic Appearance Dane H Watkins Jr
at Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion To Reconsider
Order RE: Telephonic Appearance at Hearing on Dane H Watkins Jr
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider
Dane H Watkins Jr
Plaintiffs Second Brief in Support of Motion to
Reconsider

11/28/2017

11/29/2017

12/22/2017
1/9/2018

ORDR

CARTER

2/22/2018

MISC

FREYJ

Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H Watkins Jr
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on
05/15/201810:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 3 days

02/28/18 @9:00 AM Motion Dane H Watkins Jr
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Case: CV-2016-0001618-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, etal.

Amey J Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, Anytime Fitness, AT Fitness, LLC
Date

Code

User

2/28/2018

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 2/28/2018
Time: 9:08 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: Amey Nelson, Attorney: Allen Browning
Party: Stefani Kaufman, Attorney: Jeffrey
Thomson

DCHH

CARTER

Dane H Watkins Jr
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02/28/2018 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Plaintitrs Motion to Reconsider

3/6/2018

MEMO

CEARLY

Bench Memorandum RE: Kaufman's Motion to
Reconsider

Dane H Watkins Jr

3/15/2018

ORDR

CARTER

Order Denying Plaintitrs Motion to Reconsider

Dane H Watkins Jr

CPETERSON

Filing: L4 -Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Dane H Watkins Jr
Supreme Court Paid by: Browning Law Receipt
number: 0017166 Dated: 4/24/2018 Amount:
$129.00 (Check) For: Nelson, Amey J (plaintiff)

NOTC

CPETERSON

Notice of Appeal

Dane H Watkins Jr

APSC

CPETERSON

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Dane H Watkins Jr

BNDC

CPETERSON

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 17167 Dated
4/24/2018 for 100.00)

Dane H Watkins Jr

BNDC

CPETERSON

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 17169 Dated
4/24/2018 for 200.00)

Dane H Watkins Jr

4/24/2018

Judge
Dane H Watkins Jr
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CASE ASSIGNED TO

V

JUDGE DANE H. WATKINS, JR.

DISTRICT COURT
MAGIS1 RATE O:V)SI~~ ...

:W!,N(VlLL[

Allen H. Browning, ISBN 3007
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711

en_;), 1 f. :,},\tL

16 HAR 24 Pt1 I: 53

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.: CV-16-

l~ \(b

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME FITNESS,
and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, AMEY J. NELSON., by and through her
attorney of counsel, Allen Browning, of Browning Law, complains and alleges against the
Defendants as follows:
1.

At all times relevant hereto the Plaintiff was a resident in the city of Idaho Falls in

Bonneville County, Idaho.
2.

At all times relevant hereto Defendant STEPANI KAUFMAN was a personal trainer

living in Idaho Falls and working at Anytime Fitness in Idaho Falls. As a personal trainer, she holds
herself out as being one who possesses the knowledge, skills and abilities for safe and effective
exercise and fitness program design, instruction and assistance for the purpose of helping others
reaching personal health and fitness goals.
3.

At all times relevant hereto Defendant AT FITNESS LLC, was a limited liability

company, license to do business in Idaho, operating a business within the state of Idaho, and

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

0

Page 1

ORIGINAL
9

operating a gym known as ANYTIME FITNESS in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Please see exhibits A and B
attached herewith.
4.

That on or about March 24, 2014, Plaintiff was working out at Anytime Fitness,

located at 2141 W. Broadway in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Plaintiff had hired Defendant as a personal
trainer to instruct her on a safe and effective means of achieving her fitness goals, in particular the
safe and effective use of exercise equipment at Anytime Fitness that day.
5.

At approximately 4:45 p.m., Defendant was instructing Plaintiff in the use of a triceps

weight machine and where to place her hands on the machine.
6.

Defendant then turned the handle of the machine, telling Plaintiff that "it will be

easier this way." As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's improper instruction on using the
triceps weight machine, Plaintiff's hand slipped off the handle and then the handle or weight hit her
hand, which broke the 5th metacarpal bone in her left hand.
7.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned negligence, Plaintiff was

caused to incur past medical bills in the amount not less than $21, 185.24.
8.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned actions of the Defendant,

Plaintiff was caused to suffer serious, painful and debilitating injuries and incur medical bills. Those
injuries include, but are not limited to left fifth metacarpal comminuted fracture requiring open
reduction internal fixation, and a later surgery removing the plate and screws used to treat the
fracture.
9.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned negligence, Plaintiff was also

caused to suffer lost wage earning capacity, potential future medical bills property damage, the full
extent of which will be proved at trial, in an amount not less than $10,000.

COUNTI:NEGLIGENCE
10.

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-9 as though fully set forth herein.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Page 2

10

11.

It was the duty of the Defendant, before and at the time of the occurrence, to use

ordinary care for the safety of the Plaintiff.
12.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned negligence, Plaintiff was

caused to suffer serious, painful and debilitating injuries and incur medical bills, the full extent of
which will be proved at trial.
13.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned negligence, Plaintiff has been

required to retain the services of BROWNING LAW OFFICE and is entitled to reasonable attorney's
fees and costs herein.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants and each of them as

follows:
1.

For past and future medical expenses for Plaintiff in an amount to be not less than

$21,185.24.
2.

For general damages in excess of $10,000.00.

3.

For other losses, including potential loss of earnings in the amount to be determined

3.

For reasonable attorney's fees and costs as the Court may deem just and proper.

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just, equitable, and proper.

at trial;

DATED this ~day of March, 2016.
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby makes demand for jury trial of the issues in the above-entitled matter
pursuant to Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this _day of March, 2016.

&;l_LA_W___
Allen Browning

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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V

VERIFICATION

I, AMEY J. NELSON, Plaintiff herein, have first-hand knowledge of the truth of the facts stated
in this complaint, and hereby affirm and state that I have read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT
FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, know the contents thereof and believe the same
to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this _ _ day of March, 2016.

AMEY J. NELSON
Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be before me this __ day of March, 2016, by one bearing the
identification of AMEY J. NELSON, who attested the facts contained in this complaint were true and
correct, to the best of her knowledge, and known to her first-hand.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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VERIFICATION

I, AMEY J. NELSON, Plaintiff herein, have first-hand knowledge of the truth of the facts stated
in this complaint, and hereby affirm and state that I have read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT
FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, know the contents thereof and believe the same
to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this~day of March, 2016.

11W
~Q7
AMEY~ LN
Plaintiff

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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227

CERTIFICATE OF
ASSUMED BUSINESS NAME

•

Pursuant to Section 53-504, Idaho Code, the undersigned
submits for filing a certificate of Assumed Business Name.

Please lYRt or print legibly.
lostructjons are included on back of application.

FILED EFFECTIVE
11 OCT -4 AH 8: 27
SEC£?ET~1iY OF STATE
S1ATE OF IOAHO

1. The assumed business name which the undersigned use(s} in the transaction of
business is:
ANYTIME FITNESS

2. The true name(s) and bysjness address(es) of the entity or individual(s} doing
business under the assumed business name:

Name

complete Address

AT Fitness, LLC (W107003}

1645 Woodruff Park, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401

3. The general type of business transacted under the assumed business name Is:
Retail Trade ·
Transportation and Public Utilities

0

0

·0
0
0

0

Wholesale Trade D Construction
Services .. .
0 . Agriculture
Manufacturing
Mining
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

q

4. The name and address to which future
correspondence should be addressed:
Dean Mortimer
1645 Woodruff Park

Submit Certificate of
Assumed Business
Name and $25.00 fee to:

Secretary of State
450 North 4th Street
POBox83720
Boise ID 83720-0080

208 334-2301

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401

5. Name and address for this acknowledgment
copy is (If other than._ 4 abo\le):
Peter 0. Chrlstofferson

P0Box50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

Signature:

s.c...-y of 8tale UN only

~~

Printed Na~: P e t e r D ~
CapacitymUe:__Attom_·_.
__
·. ·...;ey;,.__________~_
Signature:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Printed Name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Capacitymtle: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

IICIHO SEtlETARl <F STAT£

10/94/2811 85188

CX: 47325 . CT: 12945 llh 1292938

1 I 25.81 = 25.11 ASSllt NAIIE I 2

l) l506(1
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y

CERTIFICATE OF ORGANIZATION
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
(Instructions on back of application)

1. The name of the limited liability company is:
AT fitness, LLC

2. The complete street and mailing addresses of the initial designated/principal office;
1645 Woodruff Park, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83401
(Sln111t Addnlai1)

(Mailn,g AddreSs, If different than meet addf'ess)

3. The name and complete street address of the registered agent
Dean Mortimer
(Name)

1645 Woodruff Park, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83401
(Street Address)

4. The name and address of at least one member or manager of the

IJ;nfted llabiHty

company:·
!Ima

Addm•
1845 W~druff Park, Idaho Fal18, Idaho, 83401

Dean Mortimer

5. Malling address for future correspondence (annual report notices):
1~ Woodruff Perk, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83401
6. Future effective date of filing (optlonaf): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Signature of a manager, member or authori~ed
person.

/,? /i &JG..

~gnalure
Typed Name:

6ea'eta,y oC Slate Ule only

_R.;...ya_n_e_. _Ide
....._ _ _ _ _ __
Mel.:..·

Signature _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Typed Name: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

IE SECRETARY Of' STATE
89/26/2811 85188
Cit: tllE CTs 1M Bib 1211111
1 I 111. ■ • 1■.11 OM! LLC I 2
1 I 21. ■ = 28.N EXPEDITE CI 3

VV
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Donald F. Carey, ISB No. 4392
Dina L. Sallak, ISB No. 8004
CAREY PERKINS LLP
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B
P. 0. Box 51388
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918
Telephone: (208) 529-0000
Facsimile: (208) 529-0005
Attorneys for AT Fitness, LLC

(!,)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

(Y-

o

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-16-1618

vs.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,

AT FITNESS, LLC'S ANSWER TO
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendants.

Defendant, AT Fitness, LLC d/b/a Anytime Fitness, by and through its attorneys
of record, Carey Perkins LLP, answers Plaintiffs Complaint and alleges as follows:
1.

Answering Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint

not herein expressly admitted.
2.

Answering Defendant hereby admits Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

3.

Answering Defendant is without sufficient knowledge as to Paragraph 1

of Plaintiffs Complaint and therefore denies the same.

AT FITNESS, LLC'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
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4.

Answering Defendant specifically denies Paragraphs 11, 12, and 13 of

Plaintiffs Complaint.
5.

Answering Defendant admits that Defendant Kaufman was a personal

trainer working in the Anytime Fitness in Idaho Falls, as alleged in Paragraph 2 of the
Complaint. It denies any implication that Kaufman was an employee of AT Fitness, LLC; she
was an independent contractor at all relevant times. The balance of the paragraph is not directed
to Answering Defendant; to the extent that it makes allegations against it, those allegations are
denied and denied without knowledge.
6.

The allegations stated in Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of Plaintiffs

Complaint appear to be directed to Defendant Kaufman. To the extent that these paragraphs
assert allegations against Answering Defendant, those allegations are denied and denied without
knowledge.
7.

Answering Defendant is without sufficient knowledge of the existence

or extent of Plaintiffs damages as alleged in Paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of the Complaint, and
therefore denies the same. To the extent that these paragraphs assert any allegations against
Answering Defendant, they are denied.
8.

Answering Defendant answers Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint

as it answered each previous paragraph incorporated into it.
9.

Plaintiffs Complaint is barred under the statute of limitations.

10.

Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her damages, if any.

11.

Plaintiffwas comparatively negligent, and her negligence was greater than

or equal to the negligence, if any, of Answering Defendant. Any damages are subject to
reduction pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-801, et seq.
AT FITNESS, LLC'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2
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12.

Plaintiffs damages, if any, were caused by the actions or omissions of

persons or parties other than Answering Defendant, which actions or omissions were the
proximate and primary causes of the damages, if any, suffered by Plaintiff.
13.

Plaintiff is not the real party in interest as it respects to some or all of her

claims, contrary to Rule 17 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
14.

Plaintiff assumed the risk of the events, occurrences and damages alleged

in the Complaint.
15.

Plaintiff is estopped and/or has waived her right to assert this claim against

this Answering Defendant.
16.

Plaintift's damages, if any, were proximately caused by forces of nature,

unforeseeable and beyond the control of this Answering Defendant.
17.

If Answering Defendant has any liability to Plaintiff, which liability

Defendant denies, any award made to Plaintiff in this action must be reduced by the Court,
pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1606, in the event that any such award includes compensation
for damages for which Plaintiff has been compensated independently from collateral sources.
18.

If Answering Defendant has any liability to Plaintiff, which liability

Defendant denies, any recovery by Plaintiff would be subject to the limitations on non-economic
damages established by Idaho Code section 6-1603.
19.

Plaintiff may have failed to join, as parties to this action, one or more

persons or entities necessary for a just adjudication. If so, said persons or entities would be
indispensable, and this action should be dismissed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(7) and l 9(a) due
to their absence.

AT FITNESS, LLC'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
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.

20.

If Plaintiff actually sustained the damages alleged by her, such damages

were proximately caused by intervening acts and/or omissions constituting superseding causes
of liability precluding Plaintiff from any recovery from Answering Defendant in this action.
WHEREFORE, Answering Defendant prays the Court enter judgment against
Plaintiff as follows:
1.

Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint with Plaintiff taking nothing thereby;

2.

Awarding Answering Defendant costs and fees, pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 12-120 and 12-121; and
3.

For such other and further relief as this Court deems just.

DEFENDANT DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY.

DATED this 2nd day ofMay, 2016.
CAREY PERKINS LLP

~-IJ1~

By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Dina L. Sallak, of the Firm
Attorneys for AT Fitness, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of May, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AT FITNESS, LLC'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR
DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL by delivering the same to each of the
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Allen H. Browning, Esq.
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 542-2700
Attorneys for Plaintiff

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 542-2711

Dina L. Sallak

AT FITNESS, LLC'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5
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- cou~rr y
IDAHO FALLS, IDA.f·H!

"'r~•·u-, .

CuN,;c:. •' 1Llt.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDIC~AI~l:RIQT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY o,~~EVnfl 3: It 7
AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
.)

Case No. CV-2016-1618
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

_______________
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Amey Nelson executed an Anytime Fitness membership agreement with AT
Fitness, LLC on January 29, 2014. On or about March 24, 2015, Nelson was injured
while exercising, using a triceps machine at an Anytime Fitness Club in Idaho Falls. The
Anytime Fitness Club at issue is owned and operated by AT Fitness, LLC. At the time of
Nelson's injury she was working out under the direction of Stefani Kaufman, a personal
trainer.
Nelson filed a Verified Complaint on March 24, 2016, alleging negligence.
On April 19, 2017, AT Fitness moved for summary judgment.
On June 8, 2017, Nelson filed Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Unverified Statement of
Stefani Kaufman and Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
On June 15, 2017, AT Fitness filed a reply in support of its motion for summary
judgment.
This Court heard argument on the motion for summary judgment on June 21,
2017.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I
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II.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

A. Motion to Strike

The admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in
support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a
threshold matter to be addressed before applying the liberal construction
and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence creates a
genuine issue of material fact for trial." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho
266, 271, 281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012). "This Court applies an abuse of
discretion standard when determining whether testimony offered in
connection with a motion for summary judgment is admissible." Gem
State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d 172, 177 (2007).
"A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the
issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies
the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an
exercise of reason." O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904,
909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008).
Major v. Sec. Equip. Corp., 155 Idaho 199,205,307 P.3d 1225, 1231 (2013).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105;
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times,

on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 908 (2001).

The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106
S.Ct. 2548 (1986), stated:
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,
and identifying those portions of ''the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. But unlike the Court of Appeals, we find no express or
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion
with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim.
On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to ''the affidavits, if any"
(emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. And if
there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard, such
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the
claimants and defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment
"with or without supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of
these subsections is that, regardless of whether the moving party
accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the motion
may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court
demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set
forth in Rule 56( c), is satisfied. One of the principal purposes of the
summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported
claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that
allows it to accomplish this purpose.
Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original).

When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be
liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American
Cleaning Services, Co., 137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a

motion for summary judgment, a court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve
controverted factual issues. Meyers v. Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal
construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the court to draw all
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134
Idaho 23 7, 999 P .2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 10 P .3d 751 (Ct. App.
2000).
The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Celotex, which stated:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored
procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole, which are designed ''to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due
regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a
jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses
to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the
claims and defenses have no factual basis.
Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win ofMichigan, Inc. v. Yreka
United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho

473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002).
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his
pleadings but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must
come forward by way of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to
establish the existence of material issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary
judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho 800, 41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v.
Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The non-moving party's case, however,

must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is
not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792,
41 P.3d 220 (2001).
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to
make a sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmin., 137
Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 (2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the
plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Frede kind, 131
Idaho 634, 962 P .2d 1018, ( 1998). In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue of
material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id.

III.

DISCUSSION

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
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A. Motion to Strike

Nelson moves to strike Exhibit C to the Webb Affidavit, containing an April 2,
2014, written statement regarding Nelson's accident made by Kaufman at the request of
AT Fitness, LLC, on the ground that it is an inadmissible unswom statement.
The Court did not need to rely on Exhibit C to the Webb Affidavit in order to
reach its decision in this case; therefore, it makes no determination regarding the motion
to strike.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Assumption of Risk

AT Fitness argues that Nelson expressly contracted to assume the risk of using its
facilities and equipment and that such an assumption of risk bars recovery in negligence
unless the contract violates public policy. It cites Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984, 990,
695 P.2d 369,375 (1985) and Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene University, 152 Idaho
660, 661-64, 273 P.3d 1253, 1254-57 (2012), in support of this proposition.
Nelson responds that the membership agreement only waived liability for
unsupervised use of equipment. She contends that Kaufman supervised and instructed
her regarding equipment use and the membership agreement does not, therefore, waive
Defendants' liability.
AT Fitness replies that the membership agreement waives liability for all
equipment usage and is not limited to unsupervised use of the equipment.
The membership agreement, executed by Nelson, states:
I understand the risk of injury from CLUB activities and using any CLUB
equipment is significant, including the potential for permanent paralysis
and death, I KNOWINGLY AND FREELY ASSUME ALL SUCH
RISKS, both known and unknown. I acknowledge that this is an
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5

26

UNSUPERVISED FITNESS CENTER and I assume all risks associated
with using exercise equipment and other products and machines and
exercising alone without the aid and presence of CLUB staff on the
premises. I understand that Anytime Fitness® is a trademark of Anytime
Fitness, LLC. that has been licensed to this CLUB and that this CLUB is
independently owned and operated by AT Fitness, LLC. I HEREBY
RELEASE, INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD HARMLESS Anytime Fitness,
LLC and its affiliates, ABC Financial Services, INC., AND THE
OWNERS OF ALL CLUBS WITHIN THE ANYTIME FITNESS
SYSTEM, as well as all sponsors and advertisers, and all owners and
lessors of the premises of such clubs, and their respective officers,
affiliates, agents and employees WITH RESPECT TO ANY AND ALL
INJURY, DISABILITY, DEATH, LOSS OR DAMAGE to person or
property that may arise out of or in connection with my use of any of the
equipment products and machines or the facilities of the CLUB of any
other Anytime Fitness club, or any incident that occurs while using such
facilities, or otherwise related to my membership.
I expressly agree that this release is intended to be as broad and inclusive
as permitted by applicable law and if a portion of this release is held
invalid, the balance shall remain in full force and effect. This release shall
apply to my heirs, assigns, personal representatives and any other next of
kin. I understand that the CLUB is relying on this release in agreeing to
enter into this Agreement.
I HAVE READ THE RELEASE OF LIABILITY AND ASSUMPTIONS
OF RISK AGREEMENT, FULLY UNDERSTAND ITS TERMS AND
THAT I HAVE GIVEN UP SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BY SIGNING IT,
AND SIGN IT FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT ANY
INDUCEMENT.
ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS - I hereby confirm that I am
aware of and agree to the terms and conditions on both the front and back
of this document.

Webb. Aff., Ex. A.
Interpretation of unambiguous language in a contract is an issue of
law. Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393, 396 (2007).
Interpretation of an ambiguous contract is a question of fact. Id Whether a
contract is ambiguous is an issue of law. Id
McDevitt v. Sportsman's Warehouse, Inc., 151 Idaho 280,283,255 P.3d 1166, 1169

(2011).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "Agreements exempting a party from
liability for negligence will be upheld unless the party owes to the other party a public
duty created by statute or the other party is at an obvious disadvantage in bargaining
power." Morrison, 152 Idaho at 661,273 P.3d at 1254 (2012), citing Lee v. Sun Valley
Co., 107 Idaho 976,978,695 P.2d 361, 363 (1984). Furthermore:

The existence of unequal bargaining power is not, by itself, sufficient to
relieve a party from the provisions of a hold harmless agreement. Rather,
the party must be "compelled to submit to a provision relieving the other
from liability for future negligence [because] ... the party injured has little
choice, as a practical matter, but to use the services offered by the party
seeking exemption." 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence§ 63 (2004).
Id.

With one important exception, we acknowledge the validity of a
contractual assumption of risk operating as a total bar to recovery. The
exception is the general contract rule that contracts which violate public
policy are not recognized.
Salinas, 107 Idaho at 990, 695 P.2d at 375.

Although Nelson argues that the liability waiver only applies to the unsupervised
use of Anytime Fitness equipment, she relies on only a portion of the membership
agreement to support her argument. Assuming for the sake of argument that the sentence
upon which Nelson replies, stating "I acknowledge that this is an UNSUPERVISED
FITNESS CENTER and I assume all risks associated with using exercise equipment and
other products and machines and exercising alone without the aid and presence of CLUB
staff on the premises", indicates the waiver of liability applies only to unsupervised use
of gym equipment and facilities, the remainder of the membership agreement clearly

.

.

encompasses a more expansive waiver:
I HEREBY RELEASE, INDEMNIFY, AND HOLD HARMLESS
Anytime Fitness, LLC and its affiliates, ABC Financial Services, INC.,
AND THE OWNERS OF ALL CLUBS WITHIN THE ANYTIME
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7
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FITNESS SYSTEM, ... WITH RESPECT TO ANY AND ALL INJURY
DISABILITY, DEATH, LOSS OR DAMAGE to person or property that'
may arise out of or in connection with my use of any of the equipment
products and machines or the facilities of the CLUB of any other Anytime
Fitness club, or any incident that occurs while using such facilities, or
otherwise related to my membership.
Webb Aff., Ex. A. The plain language of the membership agreement, indicates a general
waiver of liability, which would include instances where supervision occurred, as in this
case.
Nelson has not alleged that Defendants owe any public duty, which might
invalidate the membership agreement's liability waiver. Neither has Nelson provided any
evidence to support a finding of unequal bargaining power, sufficient to relieve her from
enforcing the membership agreement. Consequently, because the plain language of the
membership agreement indicates Nelson has released AT Fitness from liability, Nelson
cannot succeed on her negligence claim, as a matter of law.
AT Fitness's motion for summary judgment should be granted. Nelson's
complaint against AT Fitness should be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Lack of Admissible Evidence
AT Fitness argues that Nelson cannot demonstrate that any alleged instruction by
Kaufman to turn the triceps machine handles outwards was improper, a breach of duty or
the proximate cause of Nelson's injuries.
Nelson does not respond to AT Fitness's argument regarding a lack of evidence
on the breach of duty and proximate cause elements of negligence.
"The elements of a common law negligence action are (1) a duty,
recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain
standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual
loss or damage." Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat.
Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-05 (1991).
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY illDGMENT - 8
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V
Holdaway v. Broulim's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606,610,349 P.3d 1197, 1201
(2015), reh'g denied (June 22, 2015).
a. Breach of Duty

Nelson alleges that Kaufman improperly instructed her in the use of the triceps
weight machine and that Kaufman's improper instructions proximately caused Nelson's
injury. Verified Complaint, at 2, ,r,r 5-7. Nelson does not, however, offer any evidence
to support her argument that the instruction was improper. Because Nelson has failed to
provide proof regarding the breach of duty element of negligence, a burden she would
bear at trial, AT Fitness is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. See Boswell v.

Steele, 158 Idaho 554,559,348 P.3d 497,502 (Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that once a
moving party establishes an absence of evidence pertaining to an element the non-moving
party is required to prove at trial, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show
that there is a genuine issue for trial); Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 508,
600 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1979) ("Where an affidavit merely states conclusions and does not
set out facts, such supporting affidavit is inadmissible to show the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact.").
b. Causation

Although AT Fitness also argues that Nelson has not provided the Court with
evidence supporting the causation element of negligence, there is at least some evidence
that the injury was caused by Nelson's hand slipping off of the triceps machine's handles.
Verified Complaint at 2, ,r 6. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Nelson,
as the non-moving party, a question of fact exists whether the manner in which Nelson
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V
gripped the machine caused her injury. See Dodge-Farrar v. Am. Cleaning Servs. Co.,
137 Idaho 838, 842-43, 54 P.3d 954, 958-59 (Ct. App. 2002):
Based on the rationales in Cook and Evans, we conclude that a layperson
may testify to the causation of medical symptoms or of injuries where
such causation is within the usual and ordinary experience of the average
person, and also satisfies I.R.E. 701. For example, if a person fell down
some steps, landing on a knee, and immediately thereafter felt pain in the
knee, saw an open wound on the knee, and within minutes or hours
observed that the knee was swelling, that lay person could provide reliable
testimony that the pain, wound and swelling were caused by the fall. A
layperson could also testify that medical care obtained to treat those
immediate symptoms was causally related to the fall. As the claimed
symptoms and treatment become more separated in time from the fall,
however, the causal relationship becomes more doubtful and tenuous, and
expert testimony becomes necessary to establish causation. As time
passes, the possibility that prior or subsequent injuries or unrelated disease
processes may play a causal role makes lay opinion unreliable and
inadequate
to
sustain
a
claim.
Accordingly, lay testimony
on causation must be limited to the symptoms which are proximate
enough to the injury that lay opinion can be deemed competent and
reliable. Just where within the time continuum the line must be drawn to
exclude lay testimony is necessarily a decision committed to the trial
court's discretion based upon the facts and circumstances of the particular
case. In addition, even as to symptoms that appear immediately after the
traumatic event, lay opinions may be foreclosed if the causation question
is not a matter within the common knowledge and experience of the
average person. Thus, in the foregoing hypothetical, a layperson might be
precluded from testifying that a skin rash which appeared on her arms
immediately after the fall was causally related to the fall.
IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

AT Fitness's motion for summary judgment is granted. Nelson's Verified
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

SQ

day of----3".___---"""=--~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this
day of ~\ ~
2017, I did send a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon tiparti listed below by mailing,
with the correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective
courthouse mailbox; or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.

I

Allen H. Browning
BROWNING LAW

482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Dina L. Sallak-Windes
CAREY PERKINS,

LLP

980 Pier View Drive, Suite B
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

PENNY MANNING
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

g AC_,,

By
Deputy ~ v '
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Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV16-1618

vs.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,

DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendants.
Defendant Stefani Kaufman ("Kaufman"), by and through her attorneys of record, Elam
& Burke, P.A., in answer to Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint for Damages and Demand

for Jury Trial ("Plaintiff's Complaint") admits, denies and alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

The followina defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or allegation
of Plaintiff, nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable, where appropriate, to any and all
of Plaintiff's claims for relief. Kaufman, in asserting the following defenses, does not admit that
the burden of proving the allegations or denials contained in the defenses is upon her, but, to the
DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
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contrary, asserts that by reason of said denials, and by reason of relevant statutory and judicial
authority, the burden of proving the facts relevant to many of the defenses and affinnative
defenses and the burden of proving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the
defenses and affinnative defenses is upon Plaintiff. Moreover, Kaufman does not admit, in
asserting any defense, any responsibility or liability but, to the contrary, specifically denies any
and all allegations of responsibility and liability contained in Plaintiff's Complaint.

FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against
Kaufman and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

SECOND DEFENSE
Kaufinan denies each and every allegation in Plaintifr s Complaint not specifically
admitted herein.
THIRD DEFENSE
1.

In response to Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Kaufinan lacks sufficient

information or knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and
therefore denies the same.

2.

In response to the first sentence of Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Kaufman

admits that on March 24, 2014 she was living in Idaho Falls and working at Anytime Fitness in
Idaho Falls. In response to the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint,
Kaufinan denies the allegations contained therein.
3.

In response to Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the allegations contained

therein appear to be directed to a party other than Kaufman and thus no response appears
required. To the extent Kaufman is required to respond, she lacks sufficient information or
DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
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knowledge to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained therein, and therefore
denies the same.
4.

In response to the first sentence of Paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Kaufman

admits that on or about March 24, 2014, Plaintiff was at Anytime Fitness, located at 2141 W.
Broadway in Idaho Falls, Idaho. In response to the second sentence of Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs
Complaint, Kaufman denies the allegations contained therein.

5.

In response to Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Kaufman admits she

demonstrated how to operate the triceps press in accordance with the instructions on the
machine.
6.

In response to Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Kaufman denies the

allegations contained therein.
7.

In response to Paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Kaufman denies the

allegations contained therein.
8.

In response to Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Kaufman denies the

allegations contained therein.
9.

In response to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Kaunnan denies the

allegations contained therein.

COUNT 1: NEGLIGENCE
10.

In response to Paragraph 10 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Kaufman reallcges her

responses to paragraphs 1 through 9, as if fully set forth herein.
11.

In response to Paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Kaufman denies the

allegations contained therein.

DEFENDANT STEPANI KAUFMAN'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL ~ 3

RECEIVE:

N0.9512

07/28/2017/FRI Ol:47PM

35

07/28/2017

I

I

14:19 Elam & Burke

(FAX)208+3845844

P.005/007

V

I,

12.

In response to Paragraph 12 of Plaintifrs Complaint, Kaufman denies the

allegations contained therein.

In response to Paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Kaufman denies the

13.

allegations contained therein.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That Plaintiff assumed the risk of the matters, events, and damages, if any, alleged in the
Complaint.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1404, on infonnation and belief, Plaintiff is
compatatively responsible for the damages alleged in her Complaint.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff's action is barred by reason of Plaintiffs release ofKaufinan.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
If Plaintiff sustained any injuries or incUITed any damages, the same were caused in
whole or in part by the acts or omissions of persons other than Kaufman, over whom Kaufinan
had no control, or by the superceding interventions of causes outside of Kaufman's control.

FIFm AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That Plaintiff has voluntarily waived any right to seek damages by signing a release
and/or waiver.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
In the event Plaintiff recovers a verdict or judgment against Kaufman, said verdict or
judgment must be reduced by the laws of the State of Idaho, by those amounts which have been,
or will, with reasonable certainty, replace or indemnify Plaintiff, in whole or in p~ for any past
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or future claims of economic loss, from any collateral source such as insurance, social security.
workers' compensation or employee benefit programs.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That Plaintiff is estopped from claiming damages by voluntarily signing up for the class.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party to this action.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
That Plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damage.

RESERVATION

Kaufman reserves the right, after discovery, to amend this Answer to add additional
affirmative defenses supported by the facts, and a failure to include all such defenses in this
Answer shall not be deemed a waiver of any right to further amend this Answer.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Kaufman hereby demands a trial by jury.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Kauftnan hereby requests that she be awarded her attorney fees and costs incurred herein
pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12121.

WHEREFORE, Kaufman prays for judgment as follows:

1.

Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, and that judgment be entered

for Kaufman and against Plaintiff and that she take nothing thereby.
2.

For costs, including reasonable attorney fees to be set by the Court.
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For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.

3.

DATED this • ~ day of July, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '2-~ day of July, 2017, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
___jz'Via Facsimile- (208) 542-2711

Dina L. Salla.k-Windes
Carey Perkins, LLP
P.O. Box 51388
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Attorneys for Anytime Fitness and AT
Fitness, LLC

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Federal Express
--;T Via Facsimile - (208) 529-0005
_

J
4852•7127-0475,

Y,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH

JUDI~AO!f!'J.l<pff f: SI

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-16-1618
JUDGMENT

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: all pending matters in the above
entitled case against AT FITNESS, LLC, are hereby dismissed, with prejudice.

DATED this /

GV'" ~-- ·--- --

- - - - --

i

JUL 2 8 2017
JUDGMENT- I
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of
2017, I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruDGMENT bydeliring the same to each
of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:

Allen H. Browning, Esq.
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 542-2700
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Jeffrey A. Thomson, Esq.
ELAM & BURKE, P.C.
251 East Front Street, Ste. 300
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 343-5454
Attorneys for Stefani Kaufman

[ ]
[ ]

pf
[ ]
[ ]

ri

Donald F. Carey
Dina L. Sallak

CAREY PERKINS

Yf

LLP

980 Pier View Drive, Suite B
P. 0. Box 51388
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918
Telephone: (208) 529-0000
Attorneys for AT Fitness, LLC

[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 542-2711

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 384-5844

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208) 529-0005
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ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
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Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,

Case No. CV16-1618
DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

Defendant Stefani Kaufman ("Kaufman"), by and through her attorneys of record, Elam
& Burke, P.A., respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, for an order granting summary judgment in her favor on any and all claims and
causes of action asserted by Plaintiff. This motion is made on the grounds that no genuine issue
of material fact exists upon which liability can be found against Kaufman, and the lawsuit
against her should be dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law.

DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendant Stefani
Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Stefani Kaufman in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment filed concurrently herewith, and the pleadings and documents contained within the
record in this matter.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

!3

day of September, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

-z

By: --~'----+----,'----""------Je e A. Thomson, Of the firm
tto neys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of September, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

4852-7127-0475,

V.

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_______..Federal Express
_-_✓_ \J
Via Facsimile - (208) 542-2711
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Jeffrey A. Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
j at@elamburke.com
jfs@elamburke.com
ISB #3380
ISB #9568
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Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,

Case No. CV16-1618
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss
)

JEFFREY A. THOMSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am an attorney with the firm of Elam & Burke, P .A., and am one of the

attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman in the above entitled action.

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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2.

I am familiar with the files generated in this action and have knowledge of the

contents thereof and make this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge in support of
Defendant Stefani Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment filed concurrently herewith.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Tayson

Webb in Support of AT Fitness, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, including exhibits, filed
April 19, 2017.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Amey J.

Nelson filed June 8, 2017.
DATED this ~

day of September, 2017.

A. Thomson
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to be~ e me this
Jeffrey A. Thomson.

~

i

day of September, 2017 by

_

·

l~

Residing at
My Commission Expires

~

l8'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
/!) day of September, 2017 , I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Deli very
Federal Express
----;7 Via Facsimile - (208) 542-2711
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Jeffrey A. Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
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Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV16-1618

vs.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Stefani Kaufman's ("Kaufman") motion for summary judgment should be granted
because there are no genuine issues of material fact and Kaufman is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law on the following grounds: ( 1) at the time of the underlying incident, Kaufman was
an agent of AT Fitness; (2) Plaintiff signed a release of liability and an assumptions of risk
agreement with AT Fitness which bars her claims against Kaufman; and (3) there is no evidence

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S MOTION FOR
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that Kaufman improperly instructed Plaintiff in the use of the triceps weight machine and that
Kaufman's alleged improper instruction proximately caused Plaintiffs injury.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 29, 2014, Plaintiff signed an Anytime Fitness Membership Agreement with
AT Fitness ("Membership Agreement"). (Affidavit of Tayson Webb in Support of AT Fitness,
LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Webb A.ff."), Ex. A, Plaintiffs Membership
Agreement 1.) The Membership Agreement also contained a release of liability and assumptions
of risk agreement ("Release Agreement"). (Id.) The relevant parts of the Release Agreement
provide as follows:
I understand the risk of injury from CLUB act1v1t1es and using any CLUB
equipment is significant, including the potential for permanent paralysis and
death, I KNOWINGLY AND FREELY ASSUME ALL SUCH RISKS, both
known and unknown. I acknowledge that this is an UNSUPERVISED FITNESS
CENTER and I assume all risks associated with using exercise equipment and
other products and machines and exercising alone without the aid and presence of
CLUB staff on the premises ... I HEREBY RELEASE, INDEMNIFY, AND
HOLD HARMLESS Anytime Fitness, LLC and its affiliates, ABC Financial
Services, INC., AND THE OWNERS OF ALL CLUBS WITHIN THE
ANYTIME FITNESS SYSTEM, as well as all sponsors and advertisers, and all
owners and lessors of the premises of such clubs, and their respective officers,
affiliates, agents and employees WITH RESPECT TO ANY AND ALL INJURY,
DISABILITY, DEATH, LOSS OR DAMAGE to person or property that may
arise out of or in connection with my use of any of the equipment products and
machines or the facilities of the CLUB of any other Anytime Fitness club, or any
incident that occurs while using such facilities, or otherwise related to my
membership.
I expressly agree that this release is intended to be as broad and inclusive as
permitted by applicable law and if a portion of this release is held invalid, the
balance shall remain in full force and effect. This release shall apply to my heirs,
assigns, personal representatives and any other next of kin. I understand that the
CLUB is relying on this release in agreeing to enter into this Agreement.

1 The Affidavit of Tayson Webb is currently on file with the Court and was submitted in support of AT Fitness's
Motion for Summary Judgment and is attached for ease of reference to the concurrently filed Affidavit of Counsel as
Exhibit 1.
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I HAVE READ THE RELEASE OF LIABILITY AND ASSUMPTIONS OF
RISK AGREEMENT, FULLY UNDERSTAND ITS TERMS AND THAT I
HAVE GIVEN UP SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BY SIGNING IT, AND SIGN IT
FREELY VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT ANY INDUCEMENT.
(Webb Aff., Ex. A (underline added)).
While using AT Fitness's facilities, Plaintiff noticed an advertisement for a new AT
Fitness circuit training class. (Affidavit of Amey J. Nelson ("Nelson Ajf."), dated June 8, 2017, 1
22 .) AT Fitness offered to its members its new circuit training class at no additional cost. (Id., at 1
3.) The advertisement also stated that the circuit training class would be taught by a trainer

selected by AT Fitness. (Id.)
AT Fitness hired Kaufman to teach its new circuit training class. (Webb Aff., Ex. C;
Nelson Aff., 113-5; Affidavit of Stefani Kaufman in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
("Kaufman Aff."), 12.) AT Fitness scheduled the dates and times for the circuit classes.
(Kaufman Aff., 13.) AT Fitness paid Kaufman to teach the circuit class that Plaintiff attended.
(Id., 14.)

On March 24, 2014, while participating in the AT Fitness circuit training class, Plaintiff
was using a triceps weight machine when her hand slipped off the machine's handle. (Webb Aff.,
Ex. C; Nelson Aff., 121.)
On March 24, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Verified Complaint ("Complaint"), in which she
alleges Kaufman improperly instructed her in how to use the triceps machine which caused the
alleged injury to her hand. (Complaint, 16.) On April 19, 2017, AT Fitness filed a motion for
summary judgment and argued that Plaintiffs Complaint was barred because she expressly
contracted to assume the risk of using AT Fitness's facilities and equipment. AT Fitness also
2 The Nelson Alf. is also on file with the Court and was submitted in support of Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Judgment and is attached for ease of reference to the concurrently filed Affidavit of Counsel
as Exhibit 2.
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argued that Plaintiff could not demonstrate that any alleged instruction by Kaufman regarding
the triceps machine was improper, a breach of duty, or the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries.
(Memorandum Decision, p. 8.) When AT Fitness filed its motion for summary judgment,
Kaufman had not made an appearance in this case, and, therefore, was unable to join AT
Fitness's motion for summary judgment.
On June 30, 2017, the Court granted AT Fitness's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint for the following reasons: ( 1) the plain language of the Release
Agreement established that Plaintiff released AT Fitness from liability, and (2) Plaintiff failed to
provide any evidence to support her allegation that Kaufman's instruction was improper. (Id., pp.
8-10.) Because the Court has already determined that the Release Agreement bars Plaintiffs
claims against AT Fitness, the only issue that remains is whether the Release Agreement bars
Plaintiff's claims against Kaufman, who was an agent of AT Fitness when the incident occurred.
As set forth herein, Kaufman was an agent of AT Fitness when the incident occurred and,
therefore, the Release Agreement also bars Plaintiff's claims against Kaufman.

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment.
Rule 56(c) provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
I.R.C.P. 56(c).
When a party moves for summary judgment under Rule 56(b ), the non-moving party
"must not rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
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genuine issue of fact." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,769,820 P.2d 360,364 (1991). The
non-moving party must set forth specific facts that show a genuine issue. Verbillis v.
Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,689 P.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1984). Rule 56(e) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that
party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided
in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against the party.
I.R.C.P. 56(e).

In addition, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Baxter v.
Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (2000); Radell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 107, 765
P.2d 126, 127 (1988).

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Release of Liability and Assumption of Risk Agreement Bars Plaintiff's
Negligence Claim Against Kaufman.
To establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must satisfy the following four elements: 1)

the existence of a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain
standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's
conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. Black Canyon Racquetball Club,
Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-05 (1991).
Parties to a transaction may agree by contract to limit liability for negligence or
contractually waive rights and remedies. See e.g., Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976,695 P.2d
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5
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361 (1984); see also Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 76, 233 P.3d 1, 7 (2008); Accomazza v.
Cedu Educ. Servs., Inc., 135 Idaho 145, 15 P.3d 1153 (2000); Steiner Corp. v. Am. Dist. Tel., 106
Idaho 787,683 P.2d 435 (1984) (holding limit of liability clause in contract would be given full
force and effect since contract was freely entered into, no public duty was involved3, and there
was no obvious disadvantage in bargaining power); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc.,
100 Idaho 175,595 P.2d 709 (1979); Rawlings v. Layne & Boller Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496,465
P.2d 107 (1970).
The general rule for adult participants "is that releases from liability for injuries caused
by negligent acts arising in the context of recreational activities are enforceable." Morrison v.
NW Nazarene Univ., 152 Idaho 660,662, 273 P.3d 1253, 1255 (2012). In Morrison, plaintiff
was injured from an accident on a climbing wall. The Idaho Supreme Court held the district
court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs negligence claim because plaintiff signed a hold
harmless agreement barring such claims. Id. at 666 (stating parties to a release may adopt
language to cover a broad range of accidents by specifying injuries involving negligence on the
part of a defendant).
In Lee v. Sun Valley Co., the Idaho Supreme Court addressed whether an incident came
within the scope of an exculpatory contract releasing an outfitter from liability from injuries
sustained by a claimant while riding a horse. 4 107 Idaho 976,695 P.2d 361 (1984). In affirming
summary judgment in favor of Sun Valley the court stated: "[t]he [exculpatory contract] clearly

3 The Idaho Supreme Court named utilities and common carriers as obvious examples of parties owing a public
duty. Steiner Corp., 106 Idaho at 791,683 P.2d at 439.
4 Other jurisdictions have held releases of liability at gyms are enforceable. See Donahue v. Ledgends, Inc., 331 P.3d
342 (Alaska 2014) (holding release agreement signed by a student rock climber enrolled in a rock climbing class at a
gym was enforceable to bar student's negligence claim against gym); see also Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises, LLC,
203 N.J. 286, I A.3d 678 (2010) (holding gym's exculpatory agreement was enforceable as to injuries sustained by a
member while participating in a spin class).
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and simply states that Sun Valley should be held 'harmless for every and all claim which may
arise from injury, which might occur from use of said horse and/or equipment,' which is both
unambiguous and applicable to the facts alleged by plaintiff." Id. at 978.
In this case, it is an undisputed fact that Plaintiff signed the AT Fitness Membership

Agreement, which included the Release Agreement. (Webb A.ff., Ex. A.) The plain language of
the Release Agreement establishes that Plaintiff agreed to release AT Fitness, and its agents and
employees, with respect to any and all injuries or damages that may arise out of or in connection
with Plaintiffs use of any of AT Fitness's equipment products and machines or its facilities. (Id.)
Plaintiff also agreed to release any claim she may have regarding injuries or damages that are
otherwise related to her AT Fitness membership. (Id.)
Plaintiffs injury at issue in this case occurred while she was participating in AT Fitness's
new circuit training class. (Webb A.ff., Ex. C; Nelson A.ff., 'l['l[ 7 and 21.) Plaintiffs Complaint is
therefore subject to the terms of the Release Agreement. As this Court has already held: " ... the
plain language of the membership agreement indicates [Plaintiff] has released AT Fitness from
liability, [Plaintiff] cannot succeed on her negligence claim, as a matter of law." (Memorandum
Decision, p. 8.)

B.

At the Time of the Incident, Kaufman Was an Agent of AT Fitness.
When Plaintiff injured her hand while participating in the AT Fitness circuit training

class, Kaufman was an agent of AT Fitness because AT Fitness hired her to teach the class-the
purpose of which was to familiarize AT Fitness members with its new equipment. (Nelson A.ff., 'I
24.)
"An agent is a person who has been authorized to act on behalf of a principal towards the
performance of a specific task or series of tasks." Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366
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P.3d 1088, 1095 (2016), reh'g denied (Feb. 23, 2016). "An agency relationship is created through
the actions of the principal who either: (1) expressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain
actions on his or her behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions
which are necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3) apparently
grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party indicating that express or
implied authority has been granted." Humphries, 159 Idaho at 735, 366 P.3d at 1095.
"Express authority" refers to the authority a principal has explicitly granted the agent to
act in the principal's name. American West Enter., Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746,753,316
P.3d 662, 669 (2013). "Implied authority refers to that authority which is necessary, usual, and
proper to accomplish or perform the express authority delegated to the agent by the principal."
Id. Finally, apparent authority "is created when the principal voluntarily places an agent in such a
position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business usages and the nature
of a particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing
authority." Id.
In this case, at the time the incident occurred, the undisputed evidence establishes that
Kaufman was an agent of, and was acting with authority from AT Fitness. That evidence is:
•

A few weeks prior to the incident, an AT Fitness manager asked Kaufman if she
would be interested in teaching AT Fitness's new circuit training class that it was
offering to its members. Kaufman accepted the offer to be AT Fitness's circuit
training class instructor. (Kaufman Alf., 'l[ 2.)

•

AT Fitness hired Kaufman to teach its new circuit training class and
provided her with the authority to instruct AT Fitness members on how to
use its new fitness machines. (Webb Alf., Ex. C; Nelson Alf., 'l[ 3.)

•

Plaintiff did not pay Kaufman to take the circuit class. (Nelson Alf., 'l[ 25;
Kaufman Alf., 'l[ 4.)
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•

AT Fitness's advertisement related to the circuit training class indicated
that Kaufman was an AT Fitness trainer. (Nelson A.ff., <J[<J[ 4, 22, and 2425.)

•

AT Fitness scheduled the times and dates when the new circuit training
class would be offered by AT Fitness to its members. (Kaufman A.ff., <J[ 3.)

•

AT Fitness paid Kaufman to teach its new circuit training class, including
the March 24, 2014 class, which Plaintiff attended. (Id., <J[ 4.)

•

Plaintiff believed that Ms. Kaufman worked for AT Fitness. (Nelson A.ff.,
at<J[22.)

At the time of the accident at issue, Kaufman was an agent of AT Fitness because AT
Fitness provided Kaufman with the explicit authority to instruct its members on how to use its
new fitness equipment.
AT Fitness also provided Kaufman with apparent authority because: ( 1) AT Fitness
voluntarily retained Kaufman to teach the circuit class (Webb A.ff., Ex. C); and (2) Plaintiff
justifiably believed Kaufman was an employee of AT Fitness as it advertised Kaufman as an AT
Fitness trainer. (Nelson A.ff., <J[<J[ 4, 22, and 24.)
Therefore, Plaintiffs negligence claim against Kaufman should be dismissed with
prejudice as a matter of law because the plain language of the Release Agreement establishes
Plaintiff released Kaufman, who was an agent of AT Fitness when Plaintiff injured her hand,
from liability. (Webb A.ff., Ex. A.) As this Court has already held "[t]he plain language of the
membership agreement, indicates a general waiver of liability, which would include instances
where supervision occurred, as in this case." (Memorandum Decision, p. 8.) The Release
Agreement also bars Plaintiffs claims that she may have the right to assert against AT Fitness's
agents-which includes Kaufman.
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C.

There is No Evidence that Kaufman's Alleged Improper Instruction Was a Breach
of Duty Owed to Plaintiff.
The Court can also dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint against Kaufman on alternative grounds

because Plaintiff cannot submit any admissible evidence to support her allegation that Kaufman
improperly instructed her in the use of the triceps weight machine which proximately caused her
injury. As such, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden to establish the breach of duty element
of her negligence claim. As this Court has already held: "[Plaintiff] does not, however, offer any
evidence to support her argument that [Kaufman's] instruction was improper." (Memorandum

Decision, p. 9.)
Because Plaintiff cannot provide any evidence to support her allegation that Kaufman's
alleged improper instruction constituted a breach of duty, Plaintiffs negligence claim against
Kaufman fails as a matter of law and also should be dismissed with prejudice on this alternative
ground.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Kaufman respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs
Complaint against her with prejudice.
DATED this

i

day of September, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:
fr y A. Thomson, Of the firm
t rneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-10

55

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'6

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of September, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

4845-9032-0204,

V.

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
Federal Express
-,;;/ Via Facsimile - (208) 542-2711

1

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11

56

·r· 1\.1 ··1-1:),J_
c 1··.) lJ c:---·'-~
·r i'--' c.'.1 YC). t~ JR

.. I'

1-..1 r:

,v

1'1./

WELLNESS COACH
Specialty: Wellness Coach. Personal Trainer, Weight Loss Specialist.
. Boot Camp Instructor, Spin Instructor, Bachelors in Psychology
School: Bachelor of Science in Psychology. Portland State University
Stefani has life coach training from the Spencer Institute. and
certification from the National Academy of Sports Medicine for personal
training. She has practically a lifetime of experience in the healthcare
field being that her mother was a physician. and has 15 years of her own
experiences working in health and fitness. As a life coach, trainer, and
author, she has delivered community wellness programs and designed
workshops in weight loss, nutrition, stress relief, energy management. and habit change. Stefanis personalized, interactive
sessions focus on the mind-body connection and its long-tenn effects on weight loss. goal exploration and achievement.
preventative health, and aging well.

Mission Statement
To use my enthusiasm and drive to inspire and support others to become the best they can be on a physical. emotional. and
mental level so that the people that I help will inspire others and lead by example with their own positive changes.

Seruices Offered
Qualify for the Weight Management Incentive Program
and become eligible for a $100 or $200 incentive

Stress Management
Stop Smoking

Reduce your yearly insurance deductible by committing to
making healthy changes with a Wellness Coach

Goal Setting

Weight loss
Nutrition Counseling

What is a Wellness Coach?

.

The role of an effective Wellness Coach is to assist people in their growth and self-awareness so they can fulfill their own
.
dreams. With life coaching. you'll be guided to push boundaries and leave your comfort
zone ~ but you will always keep your personal goals in mind. By providing a creative environment that faciUtates the process
of personal growth and fulfillment. think of your life coach as vehicle to
· · assist you in h!aching that higher level of physical and mental well~being.

"All mt1plnyeari <md dP.pencJ,mt.,; co11erP.d undar thP. Bash: 1.'onorlcan Foods lu:wlth pfon um
eliyibfo fo meel" with t/11/ 1.m1Uness coach.
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NATION/4, ACADEMY OF SPORTS MEIOCINE

NASM Code of Professional Conduct
NASM has established a code of ethics and guidelines in order to protect the public and the profession.
Candidates are expected and Certified Professionals are required to agree to and follow the NASM Code
of Professional Conduct, stated below.

Professionalism.
Each Certified Professional must provide optimal professional service and demonstrate excellent client
care in their practice. Each Certified Professional must:
1. Abide fully by the NASM Code of Professional Conduct; Conduct themselves in a manner that
merits the respect of the public, other colleagues and NASM;
2. Treat each colleague and client with the utmost respect and dignity;
3. Not make false or derogatory assumptions concerning the practices of colleagues and clients;
4. Use appropriate professional communication in all verbal, non-verbal, and written
transactions;
S. Provide and maintain an environment that ensures client safety that, at a minimum, requires
that the Certified Professional must:
a. Not diagnose or treat illness or injury unless for basic first aid or if the Certified
Professional is legally licensed to do so and is working in that capacity at that time;
b. Not train clients with a diagnosed health condition unless the Certified Professional
has been specifically trained to do so, is following procedures prescribed and supervised
by a valid licensed medical professional, or if the Certified Professional is legally licensed
to do so and is working in that capacity at that time;
c. Not begin to train a client prior to receiving and reviewing a current health-history
questionnaire signed by the client; and
d. Hold a current cardio pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and automated external
defibrillator (AED) certification from an NASM-approved provider at all times
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6. Refer the client to the appropriate medical practitioner when, at a minimum, the Certified
Professional:
a. Becomes aware of any change in the client's health status or medication;
b. Becomes aware of an undiagnosed illness, injury, or risk factor; or Suspension or
Revocation of Credentials (Disciplinary Action) 31
c. Becomes aware of any unusual client pain and/or discomfort during the course of the
training session that warrants professional care, in which case the Certified Professional
will immediately discontinue the session.
7. Refer the client to other healthcare professionals when nutritional and supplemental advice is
requested unless the Certified Professional has been specifically trained to do so or holds a
credential to do so and is acting in that capacity at the time;
8. Maintain a level of personal hygiene appropriate for a health and fitness setting;
9. Wear clothing that is clean, modest and .professional; and
10. Remaining in good standing and maintain current certification status by acquiring all
necessary continuing education requirements.

Confidentiality.
Each Certified Professional must respect the confidentiality of all client information. In his/her
professional role, the Certified Professional must:

1. Protect the client's confidentiality in conversations, advertisement and any other arena unless
otherwise agreed upon by the client in writing or, when necessary due to a medical occurrence
or when legally required;
2. Protect the interest of clients who are minors by law or unable to give voluntary consent by
securing the legal permission of the appropriate third party or guardian; and
3. Store and dispose of client records in a secure manner.

Legal and Ethical.
Each Certified Professional must comply with all legal requirements within the applicable jurisdiction. In
his/her professional role, the Certified Professional must:

1. Obey all local, state, federal, and provincial laws, regulations and professional rules;
2. Accept complete responsibility for his/her actions;
3. Maintain accurate and truthful records; and
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4. Respect and uphold all existing copyright, trademark and intellectual property right laws.
NASM may revoke or otherwise take action with regard to the certification of an individual who is or has
been convicted of, plead guilty to, or plead nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or misdemeanor or
has been found through legal process to have been negligent or responsible for injury or harm in
performing in his/her professional capacity or have misrepresented his/her qualifications to provide
services, including opinions or advice, to the public.

Business Practice.
Each Certified Professional must practice with honesty, integrity, and lawfulness. In his/her professional
role, the Certified Professional must:

1. Maintain adequate liability insurance;
2. Maintain adequate and truthful progress notes for each client;
3. Accurately and truthfully inform the public of services rendered and his/her qualification to
render such services;
4. Honestly and truthfully represent all professional qualifications and affiliations;
5. Advertise in a manner that is honest, dignified and representation of services that can be
delivered without the use of provocative and/or sexual language and/or pictures;
6. Maintain accurate financial, contract, appointment, and tax records including original receipts
for a minimum of four years; and
7. Comply with all local, state, federal, and providence laws and employer rules regarding
harassment and discrimination, including sexual harassment.
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National Federation of

Professional Ethics and Safety Standards for Personal Trainers

CPT Applicants, Test Candidates, and Certificants agree to:

• Provide safe and effective fitness program design through appropriate screening,
consultation, and evaluation of the apparently healthy client's physical fitness goals
and limitations
• Uphold professional courtesy and consistency by implementing standards for client
confidentiality, client to trainer relationships, and allied health professional references
• Maintain clear business standards and an understanding of limitations and
responsibilities as they pertain to best business practices, client and public safety, and
legal and professional liabilities
• Comply with certification renewal and continuing education requirements for trainer
maintenance and advancement
• Represent the certification credential, organization, and industry in a way which
furthers health and fitness efforts and initiatives
• Complete all documents, applications, or declarations made to NFPT truthfully
• Protect the confidentiality of NFPT certification material including, but not limited to,
certification exam material, exam questions, and score reporting documentation
• Follow NFPT policy for the appropriate use of the CPT certificate, certification mark or
other logos (also known as "NFPT Branding"). NFPT Branding may only be used by
currently active certificants and never associated with activities which are illegal,
obscene, or inappropriately construed. See Terms and Conditions for details.
• Never knowingly provide trainer services to individuals who are at risk and/or not
apparently healthy, or without proper medical release and/or without the performance
61
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of proper screening arili evaluation procedures
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• Refrain from the performance of unethical and/or negligent activities to include lewd
and immoral conduct, inappropriate sexual advances or abuses, misuse of
trainer/client confidence, reckless exercise instruction, unprofessional behavior which
mentally or physically harms the client or general public
• Refrain from any substance that may cause mental or physical impairment that
impedes trainer's ability to safely and effectively evaluate, implement, and perform an
appropriate fitness training program
• Comply fully with all certification renewal requirements
• Refrain from any liable, slanderous, or damaging remarks or literature that discredits
the personal trainer profession and/or certification organizations who appropriately
certify the personal fitness training professional
In addition, candidates and certificants must report any conviction of a felony. This must
be reported to the Human Resource Director at HRdept@nfpt.com. Reports of felonies
will be reviewed under the disciplinary and complaints policy, on a case by case basis.
NFPT will investigate any evidence which is brought before NFPT that provides
confirmation of potential or actual harm to public safety and/or the mental or physical wellbeing of another person. Investigation and disciplinary action will occur in compliance with
the Certification Council's Complaint and Disciplinary policy.
NFPT may revoke or take other action against certificate holders in violation of these
standards.

© 2017 National Federation of Professional Trainers -AH
Rights Reserved
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Jeffrey A. Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
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Facsimile: (208) 384-5844

jat@elam.burke.com
jfs@elamburke.com

ISB#3380
1$0#9568
Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF nm SEVENTH mDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J. NELSON.

Plaintiff,
vs.

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,

Case No. CVI6-1618

AFFIDAVIT OF STEPANI KAUFMAN
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

STATE OF NEW MEXICO )
) ss
County of :·&cra.£!1fo
)
STEFANI KAUFMAN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am a defendant in the above-titled case and state the following to the best of my

personal knowledge as the signer of this Affidavit.

2.

A few weeks prior to the incident at issue in this case, an Anytime Fitness ("AT

AFFIDAVIT OF STEFANI KAUFMAN IN SUPPOR.T OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT-I
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Fitness") manager asked me if I would be interested in teaching AT Fitness's new circuit training
class that it was offering to its members. I accepted the offer to be AT Fitness's circuit training
class instructor.
3.

AT Fitness scheduled the times and dates when the new circuit training class

would be offered by AT Fitness to its members.
4.

AT Fitness paid me to teach its new circuit training class, including the March 24,

2014 class, which Plaintiff attended. The Plaintiff did not pay me any compensation.
t"-f"'
DATED this _<.tJ
_ _ day of September, 2017.

-rl--

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this .J£._ day of September, 2017.

~o~
Notary Public for New Mexico

My Commission Expires

~;I f;dla;J.f
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the f5 day of September. 2017, I caused a true and
cor.rect copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning

Browning Law
482 Constitution Way. Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S.Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery

Federal Express

7_ Via Facsimile -

(208) 542-2711
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Allen H. Browning, ISB # 3007
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
Email: allen.browning.law@gmail.com
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J.NELSON,
Plaintiff,

v.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-16-1618
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Amey J. Nelson, by and through her attorney of record,
Allen H. Browning, and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
hereby submits this Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as
follows:

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Rule 56(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
Idaho Code § 72-f02( 16)
Idaho Code § 102 et seq.

Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994)
Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87,996 P.2d 303,306 (2000)
Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765,771,215 P.3d 485 (2009)

D ORIGINAL
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A.M Moreland v. 0. Y. Mason, 45 Idaho 143, 145 (1927)
Gorton v. Doty, 57 Idaho 792, 798 (1937)

Chamberlain v. The Amalgamted Sugar Company, 42 Idaho 604,612 (1926)
Goble v. Boise-Payette Lumber Co., 38 Idaho 525,527 (1924)
Shriner v. Rausch, 141 Idaho 228, 231 (2005)
Brown v. Bolts, 010605 IDWC, IC 4-009559
Davis v. Sun Valley Ski Education Foundation, Inc., 130 Idaho 400 (1997).
National Academy of Sports Medicine Code of Professional Conduct
National Federation of Professional Trainers Codes of Conduct: Professional Ethics and Safety
Standards for Fitness Trainers

INTRODUCTION
This is a Personal Injury Case filed in the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho, County of
Bonneville. Plaintiff, Amey Nelson, has alleged that she sustained a fracture to her 5th
metacarpal bone while following the instruction of Defendant, Stefani Kaufman. Defendant has
moved for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims. As will be addressed below, Defendant has
failed to meet the standard for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue of dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Rule 56(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court liberally construes the record in favor of
the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's
favor. Friel v. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). A "mere
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scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue
for purposes of summary judgment.

The non-moving party must respond to the summary

judgment motion with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Samuel v.
Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303,306 (2000). "When a motion

for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial." Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765,771,215 P.3d 485 (2009).
Here, Defendant has an obligation to demonstrate that no material fact exists for trial in
which a jury could find for the Plaintiff and that there is no genuine issue of fact in any count of
the complaint. The deficiencies of Defendant's argument will be explained in detail with regard
to each of Plaintiff's claims below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. On one occasion Plaintiff was using the Anytime Fitness facilities by herself and saw
a notice on a whiteboard posted by the office at that location, which advertised a
"circuit class" at Anytime Fitness and that a trainer ~ould be teac}ling the class.
(Nelson Aff.1

,r 2).

2. The circuit class was put on by Anytime Fitness and it was clear that an instructor
would be selected by Anytime Fitness. (Nelson Aff.2

,r 3).

3. Plaintiff did not arrange for Stefani Kaufman to instruct the class. (Nelson Aff.2

,r 5).

4. Defendant was never and agent or employee of Anytime Fitness or AT Fitness, LLC.
(Kaufman Aff. 1-2

,r 2 ).

5. Defendant was an independent contractor to Anytime Fitness. (Kaufman Aff. 2

,r 4).
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6. Defendant was paid as an independent contractor, for one task, by Anytime Fitness.
(Kaufman Aff. 2

,r 4).

7. Plaintiff attended the class at the date and time noted on the whiteboard. (Nelson Aff.
2

,r 6).

8. Plaintiff was the only attendee of the class. (Nelson Aff.2

,r 10).

9. Defendant was the only other person present for the class. (Nelson Aff.2

,r 13).

10. Plaintiff followed Defendant's instructions exactly as she was told. (Nelson Aff.2

,r

14).
11. Defendant directed Plaintiff to the machine. (Nelson Aff. 3

,r 15).

12. Defendant directed Plaintiff as to how to hold the handles of the machine. (Nelson
Aff. 3

,r 16).

13. Defendant, having observed that Plaintiff was not able to use the machine properly,
changed the configuration of the handles on the machine. (Nelson Aff.3

,r 17).

14. Defendant ip.structed Plaintiff to push down on the machine with the end of the
handle in the palm of her hand instead of pushing down with the wide part of the
handle. (Nelson Aff.3

,r 17).

15. Defendant was in front of Plaintiff directing her movements the entire time she was
on the machine. (Nelson Aff. 3

,r 18).

16. The handles of the machine rotated when pushed, they were not fixed in place.
(Nelson Aff. 3·

,r 19).

17. Defendant instructed Plaintiff how to hold the handles on the machine she was
instructed to use. (Nelson Aff. 3

,r 20).
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18. Defendant instructed Plaintiff to push down on the handles, causing her left hand to
move sideways, flipping the machine handle over and subsequently striking her left
hand. (Nelson Aff. 3 , 21).
19. The strike caused a fracture in the metatarsal bone of Plaintiff's left hand. (Nelson
Aff. 3 , 21).

ARGUMENT
I. Defendant has failed to meet the standard for Summary Judgment.
1. Defendant was an Independent Contractor and cannot avail herself of the
indemnity extended to agents of Anytime Fitness or AT Fitness, LLC.

An agent is defined as one who acts for another by authority from him; one who
undertakes to transact some business or manage some affair for another by authority and on
account of the latter. A.M Moreland v. 0. Y. Mason, 45 Idaho 143, 145 (-1927). Specifically,
agency is the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other
to act. Gorton v. Doty, 57 Idaho 792, 798 (1937). A person dealing with an agent should
ascertain the extent of his authority from the principal and he cannot rely upon the agent's
statement or assumption of authority, or upon the mere presumption of authority. Chamberlain
v. The Amalgamted Sugar Company, 42 Idaho 604,612 (1926). An independent contractor is
one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to
his own methods without being subject to the control of his employer except as to the result of
his work. Goble v. Boise-Payette Lumber Co., 38 Idaho 525,527 (1924); also Idaho Code§ 72102(16). Without the employer-employee relationship, there is no coverage. Shriner v. Rausch,
141 Idaho 228, 231 (2005). "The test in determining whether a worker is an independent

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 5

70

V

contractor or an employee is whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to
control the time, manner and method of executing the work, as distinguished from the right
merely to require certain definite results. Th[e] Court uses a four-factor test to determine if a
worker is an independent contractor or an employee: 1) [T]here must be evidence of the
employer's right to control the employee; 2) the method of payment, i.e., whether the employer
withholds taxes; 3) whether the master or servant furnishes major items of equipment; and 4)
whether either party has the right to terminate the relationship at will, or whether one is liable to
the other in the event of a preemptory termination. Shriner v. Rausch, 141 Idaho 228, 231 (2005)
citing Kiele v. Steve Henderson Logging, 127 Idaho 681,683, 905 P.2d 82, 84 (1995) and

Mortimer v. Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839,844,840 P.2d 383,388 (1992).
Here, Defendant has claimed to be an Agent of Anytime Fitness. In order for
Defendant to be an agent of Any Time Fitness she would need to demonstrate that she, in fact,
was given the authority to transact business or manage the affairs of Anytime Fitness and AT
Fitness, LLC., by Anytime Fitness or AT Fitness LLC., and not by mere self-declaration that she
was an agent. Defendant asserts that she was independently contracted to teach a single class at
Any Time Fitness and that this single instance was sufficient to create an agency relationship
between herself and Anytime Fitness.
The Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Legislature, and the Idaho Industrial Commission all
equate an agent and an employee in terms of liability and coverage for liability. Brown v. Bolts,
010605 IDWC, IC 4-009559; Idaho Code§ 102 et seq.; Shriner v. Rausch, 141 Idaho 228,
(2005). In the case of an independent contractor, this coverage for liability is nonexistent outside
specific language in the agreement between principal and contractor. The Idaho Supreme Court
has developed a four part test to determine whether a worker is an employee/agent or an
independent contractor. The four parts of this test, found in Shriner v. Rausch, are: 1) the
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 6

71

V

employer's control of the worker; 2) the method in which the worker was paid; 3) whether major
items of equipment were furnished by employer or worker; 4) and whether either party has the
right to terminate the relationship at will.

A. Shriner Factors
1.

Employer's Control of Worker

Kaufman was approached by Any Time Fitness to teach a circuit training class
(KAUFMAN Aff. 1-2 12). Kaufman at no time has alleged or indicated that she was employed
by Anytime Fitness either in a full or part-time capacity. It is clear from the record that Kaufman
was given ample authority to teach the class how she chose to teach it and at no time did Any
Time Fitness exercise any control over Kaufman or her methods, only indicating the results they
were interested in. Any Time Fitness's lack of any type of control over how Kaufman performed
the singular task she was hired for clearly demonstrates that the nature of Kaufman's
employment was that of an independent contractor and not that of an employee/agent.

2. The Method of Payment.
The terms of payment by Any Time Fitness to Kaufman have not been disclosed at this
time; however Defendant bears the burden as the moving party for Summary Judgment to
supply specific facts to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of any material fact in
the case. Where there is ambiguity, the evidence is to be liberally construed in favor of
the non-moving party. Without Any Time Fitness providing a clear history ofW-2 forms
indicating Kaufman's payments as well as indicating that she was in fact an employee on
tax forms, her form of payment cannot be construed in any way other than that of an
independent contractor.

3. Furnishing of Major Items of Equipment.
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There is no dispute that Any Time Fitness furnished the facility and exercise equipment;
however, Kaufman's duties did not extend to the requirement that any equipment be
provided to her. She was contracted to instruct a circuit training class and instruct
patrons of Any Time Fitness how to use the equipment in a manner consistent with
circuit training while adhering to her duty of care as a fitness instructor to promote,
represent, and practice safety, support, and exercise methodology to enhance the life of
their client.
Here, although equipment was furnished to Kaufman by Any Time Fitness, it was
not required or necessary for the completion of the task Kaufman was contracted for and
as such should not be considered in this case to weigh in favor of either an employeremployee relationship or and independent contractor relationship.

4. Whether either party could terminate the relationship at will.
Defendant has made no showing that would be any repercussions for either party to
terminate their relationship at any time, without cause. Because cause of action would
arise from the termination by either party, it is clear that no employer-employee/agent
relationship existed between Any Time Fitness and Kaufman. Therefore, the relationship
appears to be one of a principal and an independent contractor.

The factors outlined in Shriner are a balancing test, which in this case, clearly favors the
interpretation that the relationship between Any Time Fitness and Kaufman was that of an
independent contractor relationship. Defendant has the burden of showing that no question of
material fact exists for which a trier of fact could rule in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant has not
shown through testimony, deposition, affidavit or other evidence admissible at trial that the case
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could not be ruled in Plaintiffs favor. Therefore Defendant's motion for summary judgment
fails.

B. Duty of Care and Assumption of Risk
1. Defendant Owed a Duty of Care to Plaintiff

According to the National Federation of Professional Trainers, a trainer or fitness instructor
has a duty to provide safe and effective fitness program design through appropriate screening,
consultation, and evaluation of the client's physical fitness goals and limitations. "Codes of
Conduct: Professional Ethics and Safety Standards for Fitness Trainers", pg. 1, National
Federation of Professional Trainers (2017). Ms. Kaufman belongs to the National Academy of
Sports Medicine ("NASM") whose Code of Professional Conduct also provides that the certified
professional refer a client to a proper medical professional when they become aware of an injury
or risk factor and immediately discontinue the session. "NASM Code of Professional Conduct",
pg. 2 (2017). The NASM Code further requires NASM members to obey all local, state, federal,
and provincial laws, regulations and professional rules and to accept complete responsibility for
her actions. Id. At 2. It follows that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care to properly instruct
her in the use of the exercise equipment to prevent misuse and injury to Plaintiff. Defendant, at
the very least, owed Plaintiff a duty of ordinary care to not cause harm to Plaintiff.
Defendant has argued that Plaintiff assumed the risk and released Ms. Kaufman from liability
under her direct professional instruction by contracting with Anytime Fitness to release them
from liability for unsupervised recreational activities. This argument presents a number of
factual determinations for the Court, but legally it was decided in Davis v. Sun Valley Ski
Education Foundation, where the Court quoted Salinas v. Vierstra, stating: "We hold that the use
of assumption of risk as a defense shall have no legal effect in this state ... The one exception to
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our holding today involves a situation where a plaintiff, either in writing or orally, expressly
assumes the risk involved." Davis v. Sun Valley Ski Education Foundation, Inc., 130 Idaho 400,
405 (1997). In Davis, the Sun Valley Ski Education Foundation was hired by the Bald Mountain
Ski Resort to set up and teach a beginning ski class. The Court ruled that the plaintiff was not
barred from recovery due to signing of a release of liability with Bald Mountain Ski Resort, as
the Sun Valley Ski Education Foundation's actions were contributory to her injuries and the
Foundation was not mentioned in the signed release ofliability. It is Plaintiff's contention that
Stefani Kaufman's erroneous instruction as to the use of the triceps machine was the proximate
cause of her injury. If Amey Nelson assumed any such risk by agreeing to Ms. Kaufman's
instruction then the question becomes one in the secondary sense of comparative liability.
Where neither the Foundation or Ms. Kaufman were ever agents or employees of the principals
in their respective agreements, it follows that the release of liability should not extend to them.
Furthermore, Defendant has incorrectly compared the negligent acts of one participating in a
recreational activity to the injury caused by one following professional instruction, as in this
case. (Defendant's Memorandum, Page 6).

Defendant has also incorrectly insinuated that

Kaufman was a party to the contract releasing liability between Anytime Fitness and Plaintiff.
(Defendant's Memorandum, Page 5 "Part.ies to a transaction may agree to contract to limit
liability for negligence or contractually waive rights and remedies.").
Here, Stefani Kaufman was not mentioned or contemplated in any express release of
liability between Amey Nelson and Anytime Fitness. Nowhere is Stefani Kaufman released
from liability in the agreement.
Defendant has failed to show that no issue of material fact exists in this case, which could
be found in Plaintiffs favor, but has instead introduced a number of factual issues which must be
determined by the Court.
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2. Expert Testimony shows Defendant Caused Injury to Plaintiff by Failing to
Exercise Due Care.

Defendant has argued that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden because Plaintiff
"cannot submit any admissible evidence to support her allegation that Kaufinan improperly
instructed her in the use of the triceps weight machine [sic.] which proximately caused her
injury." Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
pg. 10. Plaintiff retained an expert witness in February of 2016 and the expert witness was
disclosed on J~ly 17, 2017. Plaintiff's Expert Witness Disclosure (17 July 2017). The witness,
KaeCee Reed, an American Council on Exercise ("A.C.E.") certified personal trainer, with a
Bachelor's degree in Exercise science. (REED Aff. 11, 2). Ms. Reed states that "To a reasonable
degree of probability as a personal trainer, it is my opinion that using the machine in the manner
that Stefani Kaufman instructed Amey Nelson to use the machine was dangerous and was the
cause of her wrist injury." (REED Aff.

1 4).

She further states that "Upon examination of the

Plaintiff in the machine, I would not have used that machine for it does not fit her." (REED Aff.

1 5).

Ms. Reed offers that she "would have had the client try the machine to see if it works, and

upon seeing that movement is restricted and the targeted muscle not activated, would have
moved on to another mode of exercise." (REED Aff. 16). In keeping with a fitness instructor's
duty of care to their clients, Ms. Reed has demonstrated the proper methods of screening a client,
evaluating their goals and fitness, and providing a safe and effective manner of instruction for
her client.
Defendant failed to follow her training or abide by the Code of Professional Conduct,
which she was bound under. Due to Defendant's failure to follow her ethical obligations and
Plaintiff's reliance on Defendant's professional instruction, an injury occurred to Plaintiff.
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Plaintiffs injury was therefore proximately caused by Defendant's failure to exercise due care in
regard to the instruction she provided to Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Defendant, through pleadings, affidavits, and testimony has failed to meet her burden to
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that she is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and Defendant's motion for Summary
judgment should be denied.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12

77

V

Plaintiff intends to submit testimony and evidence at the hearing on this Motion and to
cross examine the Defendant and Defendant's witnesses.
DATED this 19th day of October, 2017

Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the
following person(s) this 19th day of October, 2017, as follows:

[ ] HAND DELIVERY
[] U.S. MAIL
[ ] FAX NO. 208-384-5844
WEMAIL jat@elamburke.com
jfs@elamburke.com

ELAM&BURKE
Jeffrey Thomson, Esq.
Joseph Southers, Esq.
251 East Front St. Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

Dated this 19th day of October, 2017.

Allen H. Browning
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
Email: allen.browning.law@mail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-16-1618

vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF KAECEE REED

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME FllNESS,
and AT FITNESS, LLC
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO

ss
Coun ofBonneville
I, KaeCee Reed, who after being duly sworn on her oath, states that she has read the facts in
this affidavit, knows them to be true from first-hand'knowledge to the best of her infonnation and

"belief: · · ·
I.

I am an A.C.E. Certified Personal Trainer;

2.

I have a Bachelor's of Science in Exercise Science;

3.

On February 8, 2016, I met with Mr. Allen Browning and Ms. Amey Nelson;

4.

To a reasonable degree of probability as a personal trainer, it is my opinion that using
the machine in the manner that Stefani Kaufman instructed Amey Nelson to use the
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machine was dangerous and was the cause of her wrist injury.
5.

Upon examination of the Plaintiff in the machine, I would not have used that
machine for it does not fit her.

6.

I would have had a client try the machine to see if it works, and upon seeing that

movement is restricted and the targeted muscle not activated, I would have moved on
to another mode of exercise (i.e. cables or body weight exercises).
7.
DATED this

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

\?1

day of October, 2017.

On the \ i u;y of October, 2017, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public, in and for
the State of Washington, personally appeared KaeCee Reed, known or identified to me to be the
person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the day
and year in this certificate first above written.

Q)\~~-

Notary Public for Washington
1
Residing at: ~~
My Commission Expires: ~- \-;;).()~\
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Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
Steve Carpenter, 1SB#9132
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
Email: allen.browning.law@gmail.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-16-1618

vs.

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF KAECEE REED

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME FITNESS,
and AT FITNESS, LLC
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
ss
Coun ofBonneville
I, KaeCee Reed, who after being duly sworn on her oath, states that she has read the facts in this
affidavit, knows them to be true from first-hand knowledge to the best of her information and belief:
1.

I am an A.C.E. Certified Personal Trainer;

2.

J have a Bachelor's of Science in Exercise Science;

3.

I have read and reviewed the National Academy of Sports Medicine's Code of
Professional Conduct and recognize that the copy submitted with my affidavit is a true
and correct copy of the aforementioned document which I am bound by as a personal
trainer and so is Stefani Kaufman.

4.

I have read and reviewed the National Federation of Professional Trainers Professional
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E1hks and S:,fcty St:mll:mls for Pcrsonnl Trnincrs nnd recognize that the copy submitted
with m~- nt'fot:wit is n true :mll correct copy or the most recent update of the
:,ti.,n:mcntfonetl ,focumcnt which I nm bound by us n personal trainer and so is Stefani

S,

l further l'\.'C\'gnizc the curriculum vitnc ofSlcfimi Kaufinan attached to my affidavit as a
true :md com.'Ct copy of 1hc cmTicuhun vit.1c that she herself submitted to the Court and

6.

As :\ titt1css instmctor or pcrsonnl trainer I nm bound by a duty of care to my clients.

7,

As ~, trniner or fitness instnictor I have a duty to provide safe and effective fitness
pn,gmm design through appropriate screening, consultation, and evaluation of my client's
phrsical fitness goals and limitations.

S.

Ms. K:mtin:m is nlso bound by the same duty of care as a fitness instructor or personal
trainer.

9.

Furthl!r ~-our nfiinnt sayeth naught.

DATED this '}.]

day of October, 2017.

On the __ day of October, 2017, before me, the undersigned, n Notary Public, in and for the
St~ue of Washington, personally appeared KaeCee Recd, known or identified to me to be the person
whose mutt!! is subscrilx>d to the within instnunent and ncknowlcdgcd to me that he executed the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the day and
year in this certificate first nbo\'e written.

CAI:ii?{)p~
Notary Public for Washington

Residing at: Spo ~
My Commission Expires: 04· Ol · \ °\
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Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV16-1618

vs.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STEFANI
KAUFMAN'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Stefani Kaufman ("Kaufman") hereby submits this reply memorandum in
support of her Motion for Summary Judgment.
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff does not d.ispute and/or has previously admitted the
following facts in her opposition to Kaufman's motion for summary judgment:

l. On January 29, 2014, Plaintiff signed an Anytime Fitness Membership Agreement with
AT Fitness ("Membership Agreement"). The Membership Agreement also contained a
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I
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re]ease of liability and assumptions of risk agreement ("Release Agreement"). (Afji"davit
of Tayson Webb in Support of AT Fitness, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Webb
Aff.") 1, Ex. A, Plaintiffs Membership Agreement.)
2. AT Fitness hired Kaufman to be the new AT Fitness circuit training class instructor.
(Webb Alf, Ex. C; Ajji"davit of Amey 1. Nelson ("Nelson Alf."), 'll'JI 3-5; Affidavit of Stefani
Kaufman in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Kaufman Aff"), 'JI 2.)
3. AT Fitness scheduled the dates and times for the circuit classes that Kaufman was hired
to instmct on behalf of AT Fitness. (Kaufman Aff, <J[ 3.)
4. AT Fitness paid Kaufman to teach the circuit class that Plaintiff attended. (Id., <j[ 4;
Nelson Alf., 1[ 25 ("Further, I did not have to pay Stefani Kaufman to take the class,
because it was put on by Anytime Fitness, and [Kaufman] was the person Anytime
Fitness hired to teach the class.")
5. At the time of the underlying incident, Plaintiff believed Kaufman worked for AT
Fitness. (Nelson Aff., ~122.)
6. "[Plaintiff] believed Stefanie [sic] Kaufman was working for Anytime Fitness, as she was
the one teaching their class, for the purpose of familiarizing members of Anytime Fitness
with the new Anytime Fitness Equipment." (Id., at 124.)
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment reverses
course and argues that at the time of the incident, and while Plaintiff was participating in
Defendant Anytime Fitness's ("AT Fitness") circuit training class, Kaufman was not an agent or
employee of AT Fitness. However, this argument completely contradicts her prior position set
forth in her Memorandum in Opposition to AT Fitness's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff's prior Memorandum provides as follows:
[Plaintiff] was being directed in how to use the equipment by Stefani Kaufman, a
woman working at the gym as a professional traine [sic], and putting on a
supervised class on behalf of Anytime Fitness at the time Amey Nelson was
injured.
As Plaintiff has demonstrated by the facts set forth in her sworn affidavit, when
she was injured, she was not alone. She was being supervised in an event at
1 For

the Court's convenience, the Webb Alf. was attached to the Affidavit of Counsel in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Counsel Aff."), 'I( 3.
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Anytime Fitness by someone designated by the manager of Anytime Fitness as
being the person who was conducting the circuit class. She was hurt when she
followed the precise instructions of the class teacher and while on the premises. It
was totally within the control of Anytime Fitness to control who taught the class
to its members, and whether that person had the authorization to conduct the class
on its premises, when the class was taught, and on the equipment which Anytime
Fitness desired to introduce to its members. 2
(Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to AT Fitness's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 4-5
(underlining added)). For obvious reasons, Plaintiff now wishes to avoid her previous positionThat Kaufman was an agent or employee of AT Fitness at the time of the incident because AT
Fitness exercised a high level of control over Kaufman in her role as AT Fitness's new circuit
training class instructor.

It is also an undisputed fact that the plain language of Plaintiff's Membership Agreement,
including the Release Agreement, establishes that Plaintiff agreed to release AT Fitness, and its

1 The

memorandum also included the following block quote:
An agent is a person who has been authorized to act on behalf of a principal
towards the performance of a specific task or series of tasks. Knutsen v. Cloud,
142 Idaho 148, 151, 124 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2005). HN4 An agency relationship is
created through the actions of the principal who either: (l) expressly grants the
agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or her behalf; (2) impliedly
grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions which are necessary to
complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3) apparently grants
the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party indicating
that express or implied authority has been granted. Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho
495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985). HN5 Agency relationships are limited in
[*** 17) scope to the express, implied, and apparent authority granted by the
principal. HN6 Only acts by the agent that are within the scope of the agency
relationship affect the principal's legal liability. Restatement (Third) of Agency §
1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). In addition, HN7 where an agency relationship
exists, the principal has a right to l**l096] [*736) control the agent. Where a
party acts in concert with the principal but is not under his or her control, an
agency relationship does not arise. Knutsen, 142 Idaho at 151, 124 P .3d at 1027.

Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728. 735-736, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095-1096, 2016
Ida. LEXIS 6, *16-17 (Idaho Jan. 22, 2016) (emphasis added).
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agents and employees, with respect to any and all injuries or damages that may arise out of or in
connection with Plaintiffs use of any of AT Fitness's equipment products and machines or its
facilities. (Webb Aff., Ex. A.) Plaintiff also agreed to release any claim she may have regarding
injuries or damages that are otherwise related to her AT Fitness membership. (Id.)
Because Kaufman has submitted evidence establishing that she was an agent or employee
of AT Fitness at the time of the incident (a position that Plaintiff previously conceded) and that
her instruction on the use of the triceps weight machine was proper, the Court should grant
Kaufman's motion for summary judgment.

II.

A.

ARGUMENT

Assumption of Risk and Release Agreement.
In this case, it is an undisputed fact that Plaintiff signed the AT Fitness Membership

Agreement, which included the Release Agreement. (Counsel Aff., 'II 3, Ex. A.) The plain
language of the Release Agreement establishes that Plaintiff agreed to release AT Fitness, and its
agents and employees, with respect to any and all injuries or damages that may arise out of or in
connection with Plaintiffs use of any of AT Fitness's equipment products and machines or its
facilities. (Id.) Plaintiff also agreed to release any claim she may have regarding injuries or
damages that are otherwise related to her AT Fitness membership. (Id.) It is also undisputed that
Plaintiff's injury at issue in this case occurred while she was pa11icipating in AT Fitness's new
circuit training class-the purpose of which was to familiarize AT Fitness members with its new
equipment. (Nelson Aff., U 7, 21, 24.)

B.

Kaufman Was an Agent of AT Fitness When the Incident Occurred.
"An agent is a person who has been authorized to act on behalf of a principal towards rhe

performance of a specific task or series of tasks." Humphries v, Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366
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P.3d 1088, 1095 (2016), reh'g denied (Feb. 23, 2016). "An agency relationship is created through
the actions of the principal who either: ( l) expressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain
actions on his or her behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions
which are necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3) apparently
grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party indicating that express or
implied authority has been granted." Humphries, 159 Idaho at 735, 366 P.3d at 1095.
Here, contrary to Plaintiffs prior arguments in opposition to AT Fitness's motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff now contends that Kaufman was not an agent of AT Fitness at the
time of the incident. Plaintiff argues that in order for Kaufman to he determined an agent of AT
Fitness at the time of the incident, Kaufman must demonstrate that she "was given the authority
to transact business or manage the affairs of Anytime Fitness and AT Fitness, LLC, by Anytime
Fitness or AT Fitness LLC ... " (Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition, p. 6.) Plaintiff argues too broadly.
Kaufman does not have to demonstrate she had authority to manage or operate the general
business of AT Fitness. Agency can be created on a far more narrow scale - on a task by tao;k
basis.
Plaintiff also relies upon the four-factor test that is used in worker's compensation cases
to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of
worker's compensation eligibility. Shriner v. Rausch, 141 Idaho 228, 231, 108 P.3d 375, 378
(2005). The Court can disregard this four-factor test because this is not a worker's compensation
case to determine whether an individual is eligible for worker's compensation benefits.
Plaintiff does not dispute that AT Fitness retained Kaufman to be the AT Fitness circuit
training class instructor. In fact, Plaintiff admits that AT Fitness hired and paid Kaufman as the
AT Fitness circuit training class instructor, the purpose of which was to familiarize AT Fitness
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S
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members with the new AT Fitness equipment. (Nelson Alf,

~I 24.) Accordingly, it is an

undisputed fact that AT Fitness provided Kaufman with the explicit authority to instruct its
members on how to use its new fitness equipment. Thus, when the underlying incident occurred,
Kaufman was AT Fitness's agent.

1.

Apparent Authority.

The doctrine of apparent authority has two essential elements: ( 1) conduct by the
principal that would lead a person to reasonably believe that another person acts on the
principal's behalf; and (2) acceptance of the agent's service by one who reasonably believes it is
rendered on behalf of the principal. Shatto v. Syringa Surgical Ctr., LLC, 161 Idaho 127, 133,
384 P.3d 374,380 (2016).
In this case, AT Fitness's conduct satisfies the first element of the doctrine of apparent
authority: (I) AT Fitness hired Kaufman to teach the circuit training class (Webb Alf, Ex. C); (2)
AT Fitness's advertisement for the circuit training class indicated that Kaufman was an AT
Fitness employee (Nelson Alf, 1'I 4, 22, 24); and (3) AT Fitness paid Kaufman to be the
instructor of AT Fitness's circuit training class. (Kaufman Aft.,

1

4; Nelson Aff.,

1 25.)

The

second element is also established by the following: ( 1) Plaintiff accepted Kaufman as the AT
Fitness instructor for the circuit training class (Nelson Aff., 11[ 22, 24); and (2) Plaintiff
reasonably believed Kaufman was teaching the circuit training class on behalf of AT Fitness (Id.)
Therefore, Kaufman was an agent of AT Fitness at the time of the incident because AT Fitness
provided her with apparent authority to act on its behalf.
Additionally, by scheduling the times, dates and location of the circuit class would be
offered, AT Fitness controlled when Kaufman would be AT Fitness's circuit training class
instructor. (Kaufman Aff., ~[<ff 2-3.) Kaufman has submitted evidence in support of her motion for
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6
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summary judgment that establishes she was an agent of AT Fitness at the time of the incident.
Kaufman also submitted evidence that establishes AT Fitness controlled the times and dates that
she would teach the circuit training class, the location of the classes, and the amount that she
would be paid as an AT Fitness instructor.
As set forth above, Plaintiff's negligence claim against Kaufman should be dismissed
with prejudice as a matter of law because the plain language of the Release Agreement
establishes Plaintiff released Kaufman, who was an agent of AT Fitness when Plaintiff injured
her hand, from liability. (Memorandum Decision, p. 8.) (Webb A.ff, Ex. A.)

C.

Plaintifrs Duty of Care and Assumption of Risk Arguments.
As set forth in Kaufman's Motion to Strike and supporting memorandum filed

contemporaneously with the foregoing, Plaintiff's contention that "Ms. Kaufman belongs to the
National Academy of Sports Medicine ("NASM") ... " and any argument that NASM or NFPT
establish a standard of care, are inadmissible. Plaintiff auached two documents to the Affidavit
of Kaecee Reed, but Ms. Reed's affidavit does not reference the documents. It is unclear to
Kaufman if Ms. Reed was even aware that the two documents had been attached to her affidavit.
Plaintiff has failed to lay any foundation for these two documents. Moreover, Plaintiff has not
established and there is no evidence that "NASM" or "NFPT" set the applicable standard of care
for circuit training instructors in Idaho or anywhere else. Accordingly, Plaintiff's reference to
NASM's Code of Professional Conduct and NFPT are not evidence that this Court can consider
in deciding Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment because it is inadmissible.

1.

Plaintiff's Expert's Statements.
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V

The statements set forth in Ms. Reed's affidavit do not establish that Kaufman breached a
duty owed 3. Moreover, Ms. Reed does not establish a standard of care and never authenticates or
even mentions the attachments to her affidavit. As such, and as set forth in Kaufman's Motion to
Strike, Plaintiff's statements that "Defendant failed to follow her training or abide by the Code of
Professional Conduct, which she was bound under. Due to defendant's failure to follow her
ethical obligations and Plaintiffs reliance on Defendant's professional instruction, an injury
occurred to Plaintiff," should not be considered by the Court in determining whether Plaintiff has
met her burden to show a duty and breach thereof. (Plaintiff's Br. in Opposition, p. 11.)
Additionally, Plaintiff does not dispute the following facts, which is fatal to her argument
that Kaufman's instruction was allegedly improper:
About half way through the workout we got to the triceps press down machine 4
and as with all the other equipment, I demonstrated how to use the machine
correctly with proper form and I kept the weight very low. I stepped off the seat
of the triceps machine so Ms. Nelson to [sic] move come [sic] into the seal. As
Ms. Nelson turned around to sit down, she said to me "I'm too fat to fit into this
machine and I always have to turn these handles outward to fit in here." I looked
at Ms. Nelson and told her she was not "too fat" as she was turning the black
triceps push down handles outward herself. (The machine has an option to have
the handles inward for a smaller frame. or flip them over to make them wider for
a larger framed person.) Ms. Nelson did a few presses before there was a notable
noise, like something hit the machine very hard. She raised her hand up and I
immediately asked her what happened. She said she didn't know, but she thought
maybe her hand slipped and she didn't know if she banged her hand or if she bent
out her finger really hard.
It is unfortunate that Ms. Nelson has had an accident that happened when she
flipped the triceps machine press handles over and then somehow her hand
slipped or moved in some way that caused an injury to her hand. However, before
Ms. Nelson got on the machine she was shown how to properly get in and out of
the machine and how to use it properly per the directions that are right on the
Ms. Reed also incorrectly identifies Plaintifrs injury as a wrist injury. Plaintiffs injury was to
her hand-a metatarsal fracture.
4 Referring to the picture and link to equipment at:
www.lifefitness.com/commercial/lfstrength/insigniaseries/upperbody/tricepspress.html
3
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triceps press machine per the company. I feel that Ms. Nelson was show [sic] how
to properly use the equipment, and it's unfortunate that something happened with
the machinery that caused harm to her hand. However, I showed Ms. Nelson how
to use the machine properly. I used the directions for using the triceps push down
that are listed on the machine as well as relying on my years of experience to try
and prevent any injuries from happening to Ms. Nelson in the first place.

(Webb Alf., Ex. C, Kaufman's Injury Report, dated April 2, 2014.) (Underline added).
Because Plaintiff did not provide any admissible evidence to support her allegation that
Kaufman's alleged improper instruction constituted a breach of duty and caused her injury,
Plaintiff's negligence claim against Kaufman fails as a matter of law.

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Kaufman respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint against her with prejudice.
DATED this

~ day of October, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:

~~~'a_~~~~t__ __

son, Of the firm
Joseph F. outhers, Of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
·?/ft;I

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .....ut=----_ day of October, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
~eral Express
_
__
✓via Facsimile - (208) 542-27 l l
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Jeffrey A. Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Fronl Street Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
jat@elamburke.com
jfs@elamburke.com
ISB #3380
ISB #9568
Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J. NELSON,
Case No. CV l 6- 1618
Plaintiff,
VS.

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS , and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendants.

DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S
MOTION TO STR1K.E THE EXHIBITS
TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF KAECEE
REED AND CERTAIN STATEMENTS
IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Stefani Kaufman ("Kaufman"), by and through her attorneys of record, Elam
& Burke, P.A., respectfuJly moves this Court for an order striking the exhibits to the Affidavit of
Kaecee Reed and certain statements in Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
This motion is based on the record of the case and the memorandum in support filed
concurrently herewith.
DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE EXHIBITS TO THE
AFFIDAVIT OF KAECEE REED AND CERTAIN STATEMENTS IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I
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Oral argument is requested .
DATED thi s

:zl:_ day of October, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

Jeffrey
omson, Of the firm
Joseph F. Soulhers, Of the firm
Attorneys fo r Defendant Stefani Kaufman

CERTIFICATE OF SERV[CE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ~ day of October, 2017, I caused a true and
correc t copy of the foregoi ng document lo be served as follows:

Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Artomeys for Plainrif.f

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _,,.Federal Ex press
7 Via Facsimile - (208) 542-27 11
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Case No. CY16- l618

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN 'S
MOTION TO STRIKE THE EXHIBITS
TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF KAECEE
REED AND CERTAIN STATEMENTS
IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendants .

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Stefani Kaufman ("Kaufman"), by and through her attorneys of record, Elam
& Burke, P.A., hereby submits th is memorandum in support of her Motion to Strike. Kaufman
requests that this Court strike the exhibits attached to the Affidavit of KaeCee Reed and certain
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statements, which are based on lhe exhibits attached to Ms . Reed's affidavit, set forth m

Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

II.

ANALYSIS

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) 1 clearly stales that affidavits used to oppose a
motion for summary judgment must contain admissible evidence. See, e.g., /-lee/a Mining Co. v.

Stc1r-Momi11g Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (]992). In Hecla MininR,
the Idaho Supreme Court held that affidavits which consist of conjecture, conclusory allegations
as to ultimate facts, or conclusion of law are to be disregarded. Id. furthermore, affidavits which
consist only of conclusory statements, statements based on hearsay, statements that lack adequate
foundation, and statements made not on personal knowledge are insufficient. See, e.g., State v.

Shamo Resources Ltd. Partners, 127 Idaho 267,271,899 P.2d 977,981 (1995) .
A.

The Three Exhibits Attached to KaeCee Reed's Affidavit Are Inadmissible and
Should be Stricken.

When items are attached to a party's affidavit in opposition lo a motion, the party must
verify the attached items' authenticity. See, e.x., Pucken v. Oakfahco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 979
P.2d 1174 (1999) . Similarly, "fi]n considering the evidence presented in support of or in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment ·a court will consider only that material contained
in affidavits or deposition!-i which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be

1The provisions of Rule 56(c)(4) were previously set forth in Rule 56(e), which provided in
relevant part:

Supporting or opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts a,; would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
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admissible at trial.'" Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844 P.2d 24 (CL App. 1992) (quoting
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869, 452 P.2d 362, 366 ( 1969)). Further,

"ls)ince the admi sibility of evidence is part of the determination whether the affidavits have met
the requirements of I.RC.P. 56(e), the Idaho Rules of Evidence must be considered as welJ ."
Kolin v. Saint Luke's Reg 'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 328, 940 P.2d 1142 , 1147 ( 1997).

When an objection is made, the trial court should make a preliminary determination
whether the foundational requirements have been sati sfied in the affidavits which have been
submitted in supporl of a motion before the court can consider the merits of a mo1ion. See, e.g.,
Ryan, 123 ldaho at 45, 844 P.2d at 27. If an affidavit contains inadmissible matter, the whole

affidavit need not be stricken or disregarded; a court may strike or disregard the inadmissible
part and consider the rest of the affidavit. See Marty v. Stme, 122 Idaho 766, 769, 838 P .2d 1384,
J387 ( 1992).

Here, Ms . Reed 's affidaviL does not authenticate or even men Lion the three exhibits
attached to her affidavit. The three documents appear to be: ( 1) a mi Care news release
introducing Stefani Kaufman as its new wellness coach; (2) excerpts from the National Academy
of Sports Medicine ' s Code of Professional Conduct; and (3) excerpts from the National
Federation of Professional Trainers ' Professional Ethics and Safety Standards for Personal
Trainers. 2 These three exhibits are inadmissible because (I) Ms. Reed 's affidavit never
authenticates or even references the three exhibits; and (2) fails to describe how she has personaJ
knowledge of the exhibits. See, e.g., Ryan, 123 Idaho at 45; Marty, 122 Idaho at 769.

It should be noted that this exhibit has a 2017 copyright date. The subject incident occurred on
March 24, 2014.

2
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Accordingly, Ms. Reed has not shown she is competent to testify to the three exhibits attached to
her affidavit. Moreover, Ms. Reed has not laid any foundation for the admissibility of these
exhibits and, as such, the three exhibits attached to her affidavit should be stricken.
B.

Because The Three Exhibits Attached to Ms. Reed's Affidavit Are Inadmissible the
Court Should Strike Certain Statements Within Plaintifrs Brief in Opposition.

Because the three exhibits auached to Ms. Reed's affidavit are inadmissible, the Court
should st.rike the following statements in Plaintijf's Brief in Opposition

10

Defendant's Motion

for Summary Judgment ("Br. in Opp."):
1. Accordin g to the National Federation of Professional Trainers, a trainer or fitness

instructor has a duty to provide safe and effective fitness program design through
appropriate screening, consultation, and evaluation of the client's physical fitness
goals and limitations. ''Codes of Conduct: Professional Ethics and Safety
Standards for Fitness Trainers", pg. I, National Federation of Professional
Trainers (2017). Ms . Kaufman belongs to the National Academy of Sports
Medicine ("NASM") whose Code of Professional Conduct also provides that the
certified professional refer a client to a proper medical professional when they
become awaJe of an injury or risk factor and immediately discontinue the session.
"NASM Code of Professional Conduct", pg. 2 (2017). The NASM Code further
requires NASM members to obey all local, stale, federal, and provincial laws,
regulations and professional rules and to accept complete responsibility for her
actions. Id. At 2. (Br. in Opp., p. 9.)

2. In keeping with a fitness instructor's duty of care to their clients, Ms. Reed has
demonstrated the proper methods of screening a client, evaluating their goals and
fitness, and providing a safe and effective manner of instruction for her client.
(Br. in Opp. , p. 11 .)

3. Defendant fail ed to follow her training or abide by the Code of Professional
Conduct, which she was bound under. Due to Defendant 's failure to follow her
ethical obligations and Plaintiffs reliance on Defendant's professional instruction,
an injury occurred to Plaintiff. Plaintiffs injury was therefore proximately caused
by Defendant's fa ilure to exerci se due care in regard to the instruction she
provided to Plaintiff. (Id. at pp. 11 - 12.)
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These statemen ts provide nothing more than inadmissible conclusory statements and are based
on information within the three inadmissible exhibits attached to Ms . Reed's affidavit. Therefore,
the statements identified above are inadm.is ible and should be stricken .

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Kaufman respectfully request that the Court enter an Order
striking the three unmarked exhibits attached to the affidavit of KaeCee Reed, the statements
identified above, which are set forth in Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defenda11t 's Motion for

Swnmary Judgment.

These exhibits and statements should not be considered in deciding

Kaufman 's motion for summary judgment.

DATED this

2/f::._ day of October, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

Jeffrey A.
son , Of the firm
Joseph F. Southers, Of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

0#1

day of October, 2017, I caused a true and
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, lD 83402
Attorneys for Plaint(ff

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
----,Federal Express
Via Facsimile - (208) 542-2711

-_---z7
__
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Case No. CV16-1618
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S
MOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND
AFFIDAVIT OF KAECEE REED

vs.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendants.

Defendant Stefani Kaufman ("Kaufman"), by and through her attorneys of record, Elam
& Burke, P.A., respectfully moves this Court for an order striking the Second Affidavit of

Kaecee Reed.
This motion is based on the record of the case and the memorandum in support filed
concurrently herewith.
Oral argument is requested .
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DATED this

?t7~ay of October, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE. P.A.

Jeffr y A. T
on, Of the firm
Joseph F. Southers, Of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ I i , day of October, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111

Idaho Falls. ID 83402

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
__Jederal Express
~ Via Facsimile - (208) 542-271 J

AUomeys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
CaseNo. CV16-1618
Plaintiff,
vs.

STEFANIKAUFMAN,AN YTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S
MOTION TO STRIKE THE SECOND
AFFIDAVIT OF KAECEE REED

Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Stefani Kaufman ("Kaufman"), by and through her attorneys of record, Elam

& Burke, P.A., hereby submits this memorandum in support of her Motion to Strike. Kaufman
requests that this Court strike the Second Affidavit of KaeCee Reed because (1) it is untimely;
(2) contains incorrect information; (3) and merely contains conclusory statements that lack
foundation and/or are hearsay.
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II.

ANALYSIS

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4) 1 clearly states that affidavits used to oppose a
motion for summary judgment must contain admissible evidence. See, e.g., Hecla Mining Co. v.

Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d I 192, 1196 (1992); Hopper v.
Swinnerton, 155 Idaho 801, 807, 317 P.3d 698, 704 (2013); 1-U-B Eng'rs v. Sec. Ins. Co. of

Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 314-15, 193 P.3d 858, 861-62 (2008). Whether an affidavit filed in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is admissible is a threshold question to be
answered before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine
whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. Hopper, l 55 Idaho at 807,
317 P.3d at 704. In Hecla Mining, the Idaho Supreme Court held that affidavits which consist of
conjecture, conclusory allegations as to ultimate facts, or conclusion of law are to be disregarded.

Hecla Mining Co., 122 Idaho at 782, 839 P.2d at 1196. Furthermore, affidavits which consist
only of conclusory statements, statements based on hearsay, statements that lack adequate
foundation, and statements made not on personal knowledge are insufficient. See, e.g., State v.

Shama Resources Ltd. Partners, 127 ldaho 267,271,899 P.2d 977,981 (1995).
A.

The Second Affidavit of KaeCee Reed is Untimely and Should be Stricken.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b)(2) mandates that any opposing documents filed in

opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be served at least 14 days before the date of
the hearing. I.R.C.P. 56(b)(2).
1The

provisions of Rule 56(c)(4) were previously set forth in Rule 56(e), which provided in
relevant part:
Supporting or opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein .

MEMORAND UM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S MOTION TO
STRIKE THE SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF KAECEE REED - 2

102

UC! ;:su , LUl r UL :l b f-'M Io· 1LU1:SOL!:ll 1Z~

1-'age o/11 1-rom Elam & Burke

Fax 2089080071

Here, pursuant to Rule 56(b)(2), the deadline for Plaintiff to submit any affidavit,
including any opposing documents, in opposition to Kaufman's motion for summary judgment
was October 19, 2017. The Second Affidavit of KaeCce Reed was untimely filed on October 27,
2017. Thus, the Second Affidavit of KaeCee Reed should be stricken because it was not
submitted at least 14 days before the date of the hearing on Kaufman's motion for summary
judgment, which is scheduled for November 2, 2017, at 9:00 a.m.

B.

The Second Affidavit of KaeCee Reed Contains Incorrect Information which Should
be Stricken.
Paragraph 5 of Ms. Reed's Second Affidavit provides: "I further recognize the

curriculum vitae of Stefani Kaufman attached to my affidavit as a true and c01Tect copy of the
curriculum vitae that she herself submitted to the Court and authenticated." (Second Affidavit of
KaeCee Reed, p. 2, cir 5.) This statement is incorrect. Kaufman did not submit her curriculum
vitae to the Court and certainly did not authenticate it. Accordingly, Ms. Reed's statement that
she recognizes the curriculum vitae as a true and correct copy of the curriculum vitae that
Kaufman allegedly submitted to the Court and authenticated is incorrect. Therefore, the Court
should strike paragraph 5 of the Second Affidavit of KaeCee Reed and the curriculum vitae that
was attached to her previous affidavit.

C.

The Court Should Strike the Second Affidavit of KaeCee Reed because it Contains
Inadmissible Conclusory Statements that Lack Foundation and/or are Hearsay.
As stated above, affidavits supporting or opposing a summary judgment motion must be

made on personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated. l.R.C.P.
56(c). These requirements "are not satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay,
and not supported by personal knowledge.'' State, 127 Idaho at 271, 899 P.2d at 981; see also
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STEFANI KAUFMAN'S MOTION TO
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Sprinkler Irrigation Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 696-97, 85 P.3d 667,
672-73 (2004); Oats v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 Idaho 162, 166, 879 P.2d 1095, 1099
(1994).
The Court should strike Ms. Reed's Second Affidavit because it contains inadmissible,
conclusory statements that lack foundation and/or are hearsay, As a preliminary matter, it also
appears that Ms. Reed was unaware that three documents were attached to her initial affidavit.

(See generally, Second Aff., (ji'JI 3-5.)
The following paragraphs of Ms. Reed's Second Affidavit that should be stricken are as
follows:

3.

I have read and reviewed the National Academy of Spo1ts Medicine's
Code of Professional Conduct and recognize that the copy submitted with
my affidavit is a true and correct copy of the aforementioned document
which I am bound by as a personal trainer and so is Stefani Kaufman.

4.

I have read and reviewed the National Federation of Professional Trainers
Professional Ethics and Safety Standards for Personal Trainers and
recognize that the copy submitted with my affidavit is a true and correct
copy of the most recent update of the aforementioned document which I
am bound by as a personal trainer and so is Stefani Kaufman .

5.

I further recognize the curriculum vitae of Stefani Kaufman attached to
my affidavit as a tme and correct copy of the curriculum vitae that she
herself submiued to the Court and authenticated.

(Second Aff., 'Jlq[ 3-5.)
Ms. Reed's statements that Kaufman was allegedly bound by the National Academy of
Sports Medicine's Code of Professional Conduct and the National Federation of Professional
Trainers Professional Ethics and Safety Standards for Personal Trainers lack foundation. There is
no evidence that these two documents existed at the time of the incident, and there is no evidence
that they set the applicable standard of care in Idaho for personal trainers and/or fitness
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instructors. To the extent that the documents are offered to show the truth of assertions contained
within them, the documents are hearsay for which no hearsay rule exception has been established
by Ms. Reed's Second Affidavit. Sprinkler Irrigation Co., Inc., 139 Idaho at 697, 85 P,3d at 673

(affirming district court's decision striking affidavit filed in opposition to summary judgment as
it Jacked the specificity required by Rule 56(e) and contained factual assertions that would be
inadmissible in evidence and lacked foundation by failing to show affinnatively that the affiant
was competent to testify to the factual allegations). Therefore, the Court should strike paragraphs

3, 4, and 5 of Ms. Reed's Second Affidavit as they merely contain conclusory statements, lack
foundation, and a.re based on inadmissible hearsay.

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Kaufman respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order
striking the Second Affidavit of KaeCee Reed as it was not timely filed, contains conclusory
statements that lack foundation and are based on inadmissible hearsay. This second affidavit and
the documents attached to Ms. Reed's initial affidavit should not be considered in deciding
Kaufman's motion for summary judgment.
DATED this

3J~ day of October, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A

on, Of the firm
Joseph F. S
ers, Of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of October, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:

Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaint~{!

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
~ederal Express
_V_ "VVia Facsimile - (208) 542-2711
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Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) S42-2711
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENIB JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFrBINGRAM

$0 U1te_1A/If-e._

AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.: CV-2016-1618

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

STEPANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME FITNESS,
and AT Fl1NESS, LLC.
and DOES 1 through 10 inclusively,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Amey J. Nelson, by and through her attorney of ?ecord, Allen H.

Browning, and moves the court to reconsider the following decisions:
1. Judgment entered on November 2, 2017; and

2. Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment entered on
November 2, 2017.
This motion is based upon the Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider filed
herewith, as well as the Court record and file to date. Oral argument is requested.

Wherefore, Plaintiff prays the Court to reconsider the above stated decisions.
DATED this& day ofNovember, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 25 th day of August, 2015, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following attorney of record by placing same in the
U.S. mail in a postage-paid envelope, hand delivery, or facsimile.

[] HAND DELIVERY

[] U.S. MAIL
'MFAXNO. ~g-o{'-f-$i4'f

ELAM&BURKE
Jeffrey Thomsont Esq.
Joseph Southers, Esq.
251 East Front St. Ste. 300

P.O. Box 1539
3701
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Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) S42-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
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Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF.THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF•BIN611AM ,/J

7) e fl# 'e {/1//'f'
AMEY J. NELSON,

Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-2016-1618

vs.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME FITNESS.
and AT FITNESS, LLC.
and DOES 1 through 10 inclusively,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, AMBY l. NELSON, by and through her

attorney of record, Allen H. Browning, and files this memorandum in response to the Court's
Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

ARGUMENT
Protections in the Agreement did not extend to independent contractors
Anytime Fitness was previously released from this case by a motion for summary
judgment based on the release of liability for Anytime Fitness signed by Plaintiff. That release
exempted from liability employees and aaents, but did not exempt independent contractors.
Parties may agree to limit liability through contract; however, Ms. Kaufman was never a party to
any contract or release of liability and neither she nor her actions were ever contemplated in

Plaintiff's Brief
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those settings. The release of liability did not extend to Defendant as she was an independent
contractor and not an agent of employee as contemplated by the contract.

AGENCY
Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one penon (a
"principal") manifests assent to another person (an "agent") that the agent
shall act on the principal'• behalf and subject to the princlpal's control, and
the agent manlfe,ts assent or otherwise consent, so to act.

Restatement (Third) Of Agency§ 1.01 (2006)
"The three types of agencies are: express authority, implied authority,
and apparent authority." Balley v, Neis. 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900. 902
(1985). "Both express and implied authority are forms of actual authority. Express
authority refers to that authority which the principal has explicitly granted the
agent to act in the princi.pal's name." Id Implied authority is "that which is
necessary, ~ and proper to accomplish or perform the main authority
expressly delegated to an agent" Clark"'· Gneitin.g. 95 Idaho 10. 12, 501 P,2d

278. 280 0 972).
Shatto v. Syringa Surgical Ctr., LLC, 161 Idaho 127, 384 P.3d 374 (2016). As stated by the
Court in Shatto, apparent authority is not actual authority.
"As between 1be parties to the [agency] telationsbip~ there must be a meeting of
the minds in establishing. the agency,. and the consent of both the principal and tho
agent is necessary to create an agency relationship although such consent may be
implied rather than expressed."

ID.
An agent acts with actual authority when, !It the time of taking action
that bas legal consequeace.s for the principal, the agent reasonably
believes, in accordance with the principal'• manifestations to the agent, that
the principal w.ahes the apnt so to act.
Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 2.01 (2006).
The perception of a third party does not create an agency relationship. Only the express
or implied agreement of the agent and principal does. In this case, we have the principal denying
such a relationship under oath, while the defendant claims she had such a relationship. The
Plaintiff's Brief
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plaintiff believes, but cannot yet establish (because summary judgment was intentionally filed
before that document could be produced in discovery), that the contract between the defendant
and Anytime Fitness expressly sets out that she is an independent contractor. The defendant has
not yet produced that document. At the summary judgment stage, however, it is incumbent upon
Stephanie Kaufman to prove the plaintiff has no evidence that she is an independent contractor.
This she has failed to do.
Anytime Fitness, the Principal, Determined Whether
Stephanie Kaufman Was or Was Not its Agent

The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that, when there is an issue of status, it is the
principal who determines whether a worker is an independent contractor or has any other
relationship with the company. In Chamberlain v. The Amalgamated Sugar Company, the Court
stated that, "A person dealing with an agent should ascertain the extent of his authority from the

principal and he cannot rely upon the agent's statement or assumption of authority, or upon the
mere presumption of authority." Chamberlain v. The 'Amalgamted Sugar Company, 42 Idaho
604, 612 (1926)(emphasis added).
In this case the owner of the company clearly stated in a sworn affidavit that Defendant
was an independent contractor and was never an agent or employee of Anytime Fitness. Aff. of
T. Webb 1 7. There is no other interpretation that can be made considering the evidence in the
case, even if all facts were erroneously construed in favor of the moving party.
Apparent Agtborlty Concerns Whether an Agent
Has the Power to Bind a Principal to an Obligation.

"Apparent authority" has nothing to do with protecting independent contractors. It is a
means for those injured by independent contractors to sue their principal directly IF the principal

Plaintiffs Brief

3
111

11/16/2017

16:588rowning Law

(FAX)2085422711

P.007/010

has led the injured party to believe the in.dependent contractor is acting on behalf of the

independent contractor in the capacity of being the principal's agent.
When Amey Nelson was injured by the acts of Stephanie Kau1inan, she sought to hold
Anytime Fitness liable and sought to hold Stephanie Kaufman liable as well. Statements made in
Amey Nelson's affidavit filed in response to the Summary Judgment motion filed by Anytime

Fitness had to do with her perception of the actions of Anytime Fitness, which is absolutely
proper. However, Amey's perceptions do not create an agency relationship between Anytime
Fitness and Stephanie Kaufman; only the principal has the power to create such a relationship.

When the District Court granted Anytime Fitness' summary judgment motion, apparent
authority became irrelevant, since that doctrine would only be used to create liability on behalf of
Anytime Fitness for actions of Stephanie Kaufman.
Apparent authority is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a
princlgg/'s legal relation, with third parties when a third party reasonably
believes the actor bas authority to act on behalf of the principal and that
belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations.

Restatement (Third) Of Agency§ 2.03 (2006). As shown in the Restatement of Agency, the
purpose of the doctrine of apparent authority is to determine when a principal is liable for the
actions of a. person it has hired to do something, when the principal has given a third party reason
to believe that person is acting as the agent of the principal. The doctrine has nothing to do with
shielding the apparent agent from liability; it has only to do with holding the principal liable for
making others believe the apparent agent (who is not a real agent) is acting on behalf of the
principal. It is a legal means of protecting plaintiffs from being deceived by persons who are
made to believe they are dealing with the principal. It is not an escape hatch for wrongdoing
defendants to absolve themselves for the consequences of their torts.

Plaintiff's Brief
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There are no cases allowing "apparent authority" to be used as a shield of liability for
persons in the position of Stephanie Kaufman. because that is not what apparent authority is for.
All of the subheadings in the Restatement of Agency, 3rd, concerning apparent authority
discuss when the principal can be held liable. There is not one which allows a defense for the
person claiming to be the agent. See. e.g., RS 3d Agency Sections 2.05, 2.06, 2.07 (Restitution
to the 3rd party who relies), 3.02 (estopps the principal from escaping restitution to the person
made to believe the agent had autho1ity to bind the principal).
The defendant erroneously asserted the doctrine of apparent authority as a shield to
escape liability, when no such defense exists in law--.. anywhere in the nation.
In addition to there being evidence that the Defendant was an independent contractor,
Defense cowisel erroneously asserted, and the Court apparently found, that the theory of
"apparent authority" could be used as a shield to protect independent contractors from the
consequences of their misconduct.
The Existence of an Agency Relationship is a Question of Fact for the Jury

Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728,735.366 P.3d 1088, 1095 (2016). "This
Court has previously viewed the question of whether an agency relationship
exists as a question of fact for the iurv to determine." Id at 735 n.2, 366 P.3d
at 1095 n.2. But, to be clear, "[w]hether facts sufficient to constitute an agency
relationship exist is indeed a question of fact for the jury, however, whether a
given set of facts are sufficient to constitute an agency relationship is a question
of law appropriate for this Court's consideration." Id
Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 396 P.3d 1199, 2033-2034 (Idaho
2017).
As a matter of law, the existence of an agency relationship is a jury question. At the
summary judgment stage, if there is not sufficient evidence of this agency relationship, the
agency question fails as a matter of law. That is the law 111 Idaho.

Plaintiffs Brief
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The law does not allow dismissing a case with an agency question at the summary
judgment stage because a judge believes there is more evidence favoring one side over the other.

Evidence was incorrectly construed in favor of the moving party
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in Friel v. Boise City Housing Authority that "The Court
liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable
inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484,

485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994).
The principal, not the one asserting agency, determines whether an agency relationship
exists. The Defendant produced no evidence that the principal agreed she was an agent of
Anytime Fitness. The Plaintiff produced an affidavit from one representing Anytime Fitness in
its earlier filings in support of its summary judgment motion expressly stating, under oath, 1hat
Stephanie Kaufman was an independent contractor, not an agent of Anytime Fitness.
Since Stephanie Kaufman had no power to make herself an agent of Anytime Fitness, the
affidavit on behalf of Anytime Fitness, carries far more weight on this topic. Aside from the fact
that the affidavit produced by the Plaintiff supporting its contention that the Defendant was an
independent contractor defeats, as a matter of law, summary judgment brought by the Defendant,
the Plaintiffs evidence on this at this stage is far more compelling than the Defendant's selfserving affidavit with no support from the principal.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court in this case address the construction of the
evidence, the dispositive issues of fact, and the extension of the membership agreement's
protections to Defendant.
DATED this 16th day ofNovember, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of November, 2017, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following attorney of record by placing same in the
U.S. mail in a postage-paid envelope, hand delivery, or facsimile.

[ ] HAND DELIVERY

f

[] U.S. MAIL
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ELAM&BURKE
Jeffrey Thomson, Esq.

Joseph Southers, Esq.
251 East Front St. Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Case No. CV16-1618
Plaintiff,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT
STEFANI KAUFMAN

vs.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court for hearing on November 2, 2017, on
Defendant Stefani Kaufman's Motion for Summary Judgment, and good cause appearing
therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Stefani Kaufman's Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED and that Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with prejudice against
Defendant Stefani Kaufman, with each party to bear their own costs and attorney fees.
DATED this

16 Jay of Novemb

, 2017.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of November, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Jeffrey A. Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
Elam&Burke
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

~U.S.Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
_ _ Via Facsimile - (208) 542-2711

y>

U.S.Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
_ _ Via Facsimile - (208) 384-5844

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Case No. CV16-1618
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT
vs.
STEFANIKAUFMAN,ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Stefani Kaufman is dismissed with

prejudice.
DATED this

RFr.EIVED
NOV 1 4 2017
JUDGMENT- I
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of November, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

~U.S.Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
_ _ Via Facsimile - (208) 542-2711

Jeffrey A. Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
Elam&Burke
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

~U.S.Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
_ _ Via Facsimile - (208) 384-5844

Deputy Clerk
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Jeffrey A. Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 East Front Street Suite 300
Post Office Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
jat@elamburke.com
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Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV16-1618

vs.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Stefani Kaufman ("Kaufman") hereby submits this Memorandum in Response
to Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider.
The Court should deny Plaintiffs motion to reconsider for multiple reasons: (1) the
undisputed evidence establishes that Defendant Anytime Fitness ("AT Fitness") provided

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
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Kaufman with the authority to instruct its new circuit training class on its behalf; and (2) Plaintiff
reasonably believed that Kaufman worked for AT Fitness at the time of the underlying accident.

II.

LEGALSTANDARD

When considering a motion to reconsider under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2(b),
the district court "should take into account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear
on the correctness of the interlocutory order." Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank of

N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990); see also Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr.,
147 Idaho 552, 560, 212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009) (holding a decision of whether to grant or deny a
motion for reconsideration is left to the sound discretion of the trial court); Spur Products Corp.

v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 153 P.3d 1158 (2007).

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Undisputed Evidence Establishes That at the Time of the Incident, Kaufman
Was an Agent of AT Fitness.

"An agent is a person who has been authorized to act on behalf of a principal towards the
performance of a specific task or series of tasks." Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366
P.3d 1088, 1095 (2016), reh'g denied (Feb. 23, 2016). There are three separate types of agency
(1) express authority (a form of agency commonly referred to as actual authority); (2) implied
authority (also referred to as actual authority); and (3) apparent authority. See, e.g., American

West Enter., Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746,753,316 P.3d 662,669 (2013); Bailey v. Ness,
109 Idaho 495,497, 708 P.2d 900,902 (1985); Hieb v. Minn. Farmers Union, 105 Idaho 694,
697,672 P.2d 572, 575 (1983); see also Arbon Valley Solar, LLC. v. Thomas & Betts Corp., No.
1:16-CV-0070-EJL-REB, 2017 WL 277402, at *4 (D. Idaho Jan. 19, 2017).
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Whether facts sufficient to constitute an agency relationship exist is a question of fact for
the jury; however. whether a given set of facts are sufficient to constitute an agency relationship
is a question of law. Humphries, 159 Idaho at 735, 366 P.3d at 1095; American West, 155 Idaho
at 753, 316 P.3d at 669 (stating the existence of an agency relationship becomes a question of
law where the question depends on the construction of a legal instrument). The latter is the issue
properly decided by this Court on summary judgment.
The Idaho Supreme Court has long instructed that the "important factor is the control or
right of control reserved by the [principal] over the functions and duties of the agent." Koch v.

Elkins, 71 Idaho 50, 57, 225 P.2d 457, 462 (1950); Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop.
Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317, 396 P.3d 1199 (2017) (stating the important factor when
determining whether an agency relationship exists is the control or right of control reserved by
the principal over the functions and duties of the agent). It is immaterial what AT Fitness says
after-the-fact about what the relationship was with Kaufman. What matters is what the facts
before and at the time infer about control.

1.

AT Fitness Provided Kaufman With Express Authority When It Hired
Kaufman to Be the Instructor of AT Fitness's Circuit Training Class.

"Express authority" refers to the authority a principal has explicitly granted the agent to
act in the principal's name. American West, 155 Idaho at 753, 316 P.3d at 669. In Caballero v.

Wikse, the Idaho Supreme Court stated as follows in analyzing evidence necessary to prove
express authority:
The declarations of an alleged agent, standing alone, are insufficient to prove that
the principal has conferred such authority. However, the authority of the agent to
act for and on behalf of his principal does not have to be established by direct or
positive proof, but may be inferred from dealings, circumstances, acts and
conduct.
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Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329,333, 92 P.3d 1076, 1080 (2004) (underline added).

In this case, AT Fitness provided Kaufman with the express authority to teach its circuit
training class on behalf of AT Fitness. (Affidavit of Stefani Kaufman in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Kaufman Aff."),

,r 2; Affidavit of Amey J

Nelson ("Nelson Aff."),

,r,r 3-5,

22, 24-25.) It is undisputed that AT Fitness controlled the dates and times that Kaufman would
teach its circuit training class. (Kaufman Aff., ~13.)
Moreover, Kaufman set forth sufficient evidence in support of her motion for summary
judgment to show that she was an agent of AT Fitness when the incident occurred. The burden
then shifted to Plaintiff to prove that Kaufman was an independent contractor. Plaintiff
speculates that there may be a contract between AT Fitness and Kaufman describing its
relationship. However, Plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment with speculation. See, e.g.,
Eagle Equity Fund, LLC v. TitleOne Corp., 161 Idaho 355,360,386 P.3d 496, 501 (2016), reh'g
denied (Jan. 9, 2017) 1• The Court can therefore disregard Plaintiffs argument that Kaufman was

required to prove at summary judgment that Kaufman was not an independent contractor.
(Plaintiffs Brief, p. 3.)
Even assuming a contract exists between AT Fitness and Kaufman and describes
Kaufman as an independent contractor, it is immaterial because the contract is not controlling-it
is the actions and facts that describe the relationship. See, e.g., Nat'! Trailer Convoy, Inc. v.
Employment Sec. Agency of Idaho, 83 Idaho 24 7, 251, 360 P.2d 994, 996 ( 1961) {"The question
1 "Flimsy or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which are not genuine, or disputes as to matters of
fonn do not create genuine issues which will preclude summary judgment. Neither is a mere pleading allegation
sufficient to create a genuine issue as against affidavits and other evidentiary materials which show the allegation to
be false. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create an issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might
rely." Eagle Equity Fund, llC, 161 Idaho at 360,386 P.3d at 501 (citations omitted); see also Zehm v. Associated
Logging Contractors, Inc., 116 Idaho 349, 350, 775 P.2d 1191, 1192 ( 1988) ("It is axiomatic that upon a motion for
summary judgment the non-moving party may not rely upon its pleadings, but must come forward with evidence by
way of affidavit or otherwise which contradicts the evidence submitted by the moving party, and which establishes
the existence of a material issue of disputed fact.").
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whether a relationship is one of employer-employee or of principal-independent contractor is one
which must be determined from all the facts and circumstances of the individual case.");
Melichar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 143 Idaho 716, 722, 152 P.3d 587, 593 (2007). The

primary factor in making this determination is the right to control. Nat'/ Trailer Convoy, Inc., 83
Idaho at 252, 360 P.2d at 997. As set forth above, it is undisputed that AT Fitness controlled
when Kaufman would teach the circuit training class. (Kaufman Alf,

ii

3.) Additionally, by

limiting the circuit training class to its new fitness equipment, AT Fitness controlled the scope of
Kaufman's instruction that she was to provide to AT Fitness members during the class. (Nelson

Alf, 124.)
Accordingly, AT Fitness provided Kaufman with the express authority to teach its new
circuit training class on its behalf. Therefore, Plaintiffs negligence claim against Kaufman was
properly dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law on summary judgment because the plain
language of the Release Agreement establishes Plaintiff released Kaufman, who was an agent of
AT Fitness when Plaintiff injured her hand, from liability.
2.

Kaufman Was Provided With Apparent Authority.

Apparent authority "is created when the principal voluntarily places an agent in such a
position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business usages and the nature
of a particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing
authority." American West, 155 Idaho at 753, 316 P.3d at 669. "Apparent authority differs from
express and implied authority in that it is not based on the words and conduct of the principal
toward the agent, but on the principal's words and conduct toward the third party," Tri-Circle,
Inc. v. Brugger Corp., 121 Idaho 950, 954-55, 829 P.2d 540, 544-45 (Ct. App. 1992) (underline

added). In short, the doctrine of apparent authority has two essential elements: ( 1) conduct by the
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principal that would lead a person to reasonably believe that another person acts on the
principal's behalf; and (2) acceptance of the agent's service by one who reasonably believes it is
rendered on behalf of the principal. Shatto v. Syringa Surgical Ctr., LLC, 161 Idaho 127, 133,
384 P.3d 374,380 (2016); see also Clarkv. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10,501 P.2d 278 (1972) (finding
evidence that employee had function to oversee daily operations of a dairy, had authority to write
checks for dairy, and that employer told employee he could buy hay for dairy if it were good hay
supported finding that employee had implied or apparent authority to buy hay on behalf of
employer).
Here, the following undisputed evidence establishes that AT Fitness's (the principal)
conduct towards Plaintiff led her (a third party) to believe that Kaufman was acting on behalf of
AT Fitness when the underlying incident occurred; thereby establishing apparent authority:
•

AT Fitness's advertisement related to the circuit training class indicated
that Kaufman was an AT Fitness trainer. (Nelson Aff., 114, 24-25.)

•

AT Fitness paid Kaufman to teach its new circuit training class, including the
March 24, 2014, class, which Plaintiff attended. (Nelson Alf, 1 25; Kaufman A.ff,
, 4.)

•

"With the ad for the class being immediately next to [AT Fitness's]
manager's office, and the manager having identified Stefani Kaufman as
the teacher of that class, and directing me to wait for her, by all
appearances it was a class advertised and taught at Anytime Fitness by
someone working for Anytime Fitness." (Nelson Alf, at 1 22.) 2

2 Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to AT Fitness's Motion for Summary Judgment further establishes that
Kaufman was provided with apparent authority:

[Plaintiff] was being directed in how to use the equipment by Stefani Kaufman, a woman working at the gym as a
professional traine [sic], and puning on a supervised class on behalf of Anytime Fitness at the time Amey Nelson
was injured.
[Plaintiff] was being supervised in an event at Anytime Fitness by someone designated by the manager of Anytime
Fitness as being the person who was conducting the circuit class. She was hurt when she followed the precise
instructions of the class teacher and while on the premises. It was totally within the control of Anytime Fitness to
control who taught the class to its members, and whether that person had the authorization to conduct the class on its
premises, when the class was taught. and on the equipment which Anytime Fitness desired to introduce to its
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Based on this undisputed evidence, AT Fitness's words and conduct that were directed
towards its members, including Plaintiff, establish that it provided Kaufman with apparent
authority. Significantly, and fatal to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, it is an undisputed fact
that Plaintiff reasonably believed that Kaufman had the authority to act on behalf of AT Fitness
while she taught the circuit training class. See Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147
Idaho 109,116,206 P.3d 473,480 (2009) (stating a third party who asserts apparent authority is
required to prove a reasonable belief that the actor had authority to act on behalf of the principal
that is traceable to the principal's manifestations to the third-party3). As such, AT Fitness
provided Kaufman with apparent authority to teach the new circuit training class on its behalf.
Consequently, Plaintiffs argument that Kaufman asserted the doctrine of apparent authority as a
shield to escape liability in this case is misguided. Kaufman asserted that she was provided with
apparent authority in order to establish the type of her relationship with AT Fitness at the time
of the accident. It just so happens that if an agency relationship exists, the Release of Liability
bars Plaintiffs claims that she may have the right to assert against AT Fitness's agents-which
includes Kaufman.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court should deny Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider because
Plaintiff has not submitted any new evidence or facts that bear on the correctness of the Court's
prior decision that the plain language of the Release Agreement establishes Plaintiff released

members, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to AT Fitness '.1· Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 4-S
(underlining added).
3

In Jones, the third party asserting apparent authority was the plaintiff.
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Kaufman, who was an agent of AT Fitness when Plaintiff injured her hand, from liability in this
case.
DATED this

/(,i day of December, 2017.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

efftey A.
son, Of the firm
Joseph F. Southers, Of the firm
Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

JT'h

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of December, 2017, I caused a true and
conect copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
__f~'Via Facsimile -(208) 542-2711

4818-8309-8711, V 1
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Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
Steve Carpenter, ISB#9132
BROWNING LAW
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2018

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: CV-2016-1618

vs.

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME FITNESS,
and AT FITNESS, LLC.
and DOES 1 through 10 inclusively,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, AMEY J. NELSON, by and through her

attorney of record, Allen H. Browning, and files this memorandum in response to Defendant's
response to Plaintiff's motion to reconsider.
ARGUMENT
Summary Judgment was granted prematurely.

The Court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue of dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Rule 56(e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court liberally construes the record in favor of

the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's
Plaintiff's Second Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
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favor. Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). A "mere
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue
for purposes of summary judgment.

The non-moving party must respond to the summary

judgment motion with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Samuel v.
Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87,996 P.2d 303,306 (2000).

Any party who brings a summary judgment motion bears the burden of proving there is
no genuine issue for trial. This has not been done.
First, the Defendant has failed to produce the contract between Stefanie Kaufmann and
Anytime Fitness, which she certainly has in her possession. Instead, the Defendant has asked the
court to ignore the actual relationship between Kaufman and the LLC., and urges the court to
allow it to defend on the theory of apparent authority, on the unfounded proposition that such a
theory is a basis for a defense to Kaufman.

"Agency" is not a concept in the abstract. As the

Restatement of Agency states:
"Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a "principal")
manifests assent to another person (an "agent") that the agent shall act on the principal's
behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise
consents so to act."
Restatement of the Law, Third: Agency Section 1.01.
Agency is a fiduciary r(?lationship to people with whom the principal acts; his fiduciary
responsibility to third parties exists when an agent acts on his behalf. This was stated quite
clearly and accurately in the Plaintiffs original brief on this matter.
Apparent authority is not a defense to that apparent agent; it is a means for an injured
party to hold a principal liable for the actions of the apparent agent.
Apparent authority differs from actual authority. It is created when the principal
voluntarily places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with the business usages and the nature of a particular business, is
Plaintiffs Second Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
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justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority.
Apparent authority cannot be created by the acts and statements of the agent
alone.

Am. W Enters. v. CNH, LLC., 155 Idaho 746 (2013)(emphasis added). Two things are of note
here. First, the recognition by the Supreme Court that "apparent authority" is different from
"actual authority." There is a difference between a real agent and one acting with apparent
authority, and again, this has to do with actions of the principal which bind it to representations
made by anyone when the principal made a third party believe that person speaking was
speaking on behalf of the principal.
Second, agency, actual or apparent, is created by Anytime Fitness, not by Stefani
Kaufman's statement of belief. For the purpose of the Defendant's motion, proof of apparent
authority is irrelevant. The question is: was the Defendant an actual agent of Anytime Fitness or
was the Defendant an independent contractor? The Defendant has not denied that she has a
contract with Anytime Fitness. Why hasn't she produced the contract? Plaintiff believes she has
not produced the contract because the contract would spell out that she is an independent
contractor and not an agent of Anytime Fitness.
Plaintiffs have; however, confronted this motion directly and properly, by showing that
Kaufman was not considered an agent, in any capacity, by Anytime Fitness.
Where are Stefanie Kaufman's affidavits from anyone from Anytime Fitness? She has
neither her contract from Anytime Fitness nor an affidavit from anyone from Anytime Fitness
stating what her status with that company was. Defendant Kaufman has failed to provide any
evidence to demonstrate that she was an agent of Anytime Fitness aside from mere speculation
and inference drawn from her contracted ability to teach a single class. Defendant Kaufman
admits on page three (3) of her "memorandum in response to Plaintiff's brief in support of

Plaintiffs Second Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider
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motion to reconsider" that "Whether facts sufficient to constitute an agency relationship exist is a
question of fact for the jury." Memorandum in response to Plaintifrs brief in support of motion
to reconsider, quoting Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728 (2016).
"When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable
inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Id at 735.
Has the Plaintiff produced evidence that Stephani Kaufman was an independent
contractor? Yes.

Burdens have not shifted
"The declarations of an alleged agent made outside the presence of the alleged principal
are, of themselves, incompetent to prove agency." Clarkv. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12,501 P.2d
278,280 (1972), citing Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho 466, (1922). Apparent authority of an
agent is determined by acts of the principal not acts of the agent. It is conduct of principal and
not of agent that binds the principal. Declarations of an agent are insufficient to prove the grant
of power exercised by him and bind his principal to their parties. Chamberlain v. Amalgamated

Sugar Co., 42 Idaho 604,247 P. 12.
Defendant Kaufman has fallaciously argued that the burden shifted to the Plaintiff to
prove that Kaufman was an independent contractor.

Plaintiff must show facts contrary to

Defendant's assertions in order to survive summary judgment, but there is no shifting of
evidential burden. The burden remains consistently on the Defendant to prove their defense.
The Defendant has provided no showing of facts or evidence which could lead to the conclusion
that Defendant Kaufman had any legal authority to act for, contract for, order inventory for, or

Plaintiff's Second Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider

4

131

otherwise perform any of the duties given to a legal agent. Defendant has further attempted to
claim that a failed argument by Plaintiffs against AT Fitness, LLC., attempting to prove that AT
Fitness was liable for the actions of Defendant Kaufman, but that could not be established and is
not controlling.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court in this case address the construction of the
evidence, the dispositive issues of fact, and the extension of the membership agreement's
protections to Defendant.
DATED this 21st day of February, 2018.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 21st day of February, 2018, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following attorney of record by placing same in the
U.S. mail in a postage-paid envelope, hand delivery, or facsimile.

[ ] HAND DELIVERY
[]U.S.MAIL

[] FAX NO.

2JJ8' :3?1-/ ·' 'o~'f'f

Plaintiffs Second Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider

ELAM&BURKE
Jeffrey Thomson, Esq.
Joseph Southers, Esq.
251 East Front St. Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
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AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendants.
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Case No. CV-2016-1618
BENCH MEMORANDUM RE:
KAUFMAN'S MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Should Nelson's Motion to Reconsider be granted?

CONCLUSION:

No. The undisputed facts establish, as a matter of law, that

Kaufman had express and apparent authority to act as Anytime Fitness's agent in teacher
the circuit class. The membership agreement bars Nelson's negligence claim against
Kaufman.

I.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

A. Motion to Reconsider

Rule 1 l.2(b)(1) states:
A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final
judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the
entry of a final judgment. A motion to reconsider an order entered after the
entry of final judgment must be made within 14 days after entry of the
order.
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained:
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 l(a)(2)(B). On
a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible
evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order.
See PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d
1180, 1184 (2009) (citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank of
BENCH MEMORANDUM RE: KAUFMAN'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER - I

134

N Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). However, a
motion for reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or
authority. When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the district court
must apply the same standard of review that the court applied when
deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. In other words, if
the original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so is
the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the original
order was governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to
the motion for reconsideration.
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105;

Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times,
on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 908 (2001).
When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be
liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American

Cleaning Services, Co., 137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, a court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve
controverted factual issues. Meyers v. Lott, 133 Idaho 846,993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal
construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the court to draw all
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134
Idaho 237,999 P.2d 892 (2000); Madridv. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App.
2000).
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his
BENCH MEMORANDUM RE: KAUFMAN'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 2
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pleadings but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must
come forward by way of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to
establish the existence of material issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary
judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 136 Idaho 800, 41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v.
Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The non-moving party's case, however,

must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is
not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792,
41 P.3d 220 (2001).
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to
make a sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmin., 137
Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 (2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the
plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Frede kind, 131
Idaho 634,962 P.2d 1018, (1998). In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue of
material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Kaufman was an agent of Anytime Fitness.
This Court held in its July 7, 2017, Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion
for Summary Judgment, that the membership agreement, executed by Nelson, was valid
and released Anytime Fitness from liability. Under the plain language of the membership
agreement, Nelson waived liability on behalf of Anytime Fitness and its agents. At the
November 2, 2017, hearing this Court determined there was no genuine issue of material
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fact that Kaufman was an agent of Anytime Fitness and granted summary judgment in
favor of Kaufman.
Nelson asks this Court to reconsider that determination. She argues Kaufman was
an independent contractor and, therefore, the membership agreement's waiver ofliability
does not apply.

a. Independent contractor status does not preclude a finding of agency.
Nelson argues, "the owner of the company clearly stated in a sworn affidavit that
[Kaufman] was an independent contractor and was never an agent or employee of
Anytime Fitness." 1 P's Br. at 4 (citing Webb Aff. , 7). Nelson's argument appears to be
that an individual cannot simultaneously be an independent contractor and an agent.
Nelson believes that if there is a question of fact regarding Kaufman's status as an
independent contractor, then there must likewise be a question of fact regarding
Kaufman's status as an agent of Anytime Fitness.
Nelson's premise is faulty. "An independent contractor may or may not be an
agent, and serving concurrently as an agent and as an independent contractor is not
mutually exclusive." 41 Am. Jur. 2d Independent Contractors§ 2 (notes omitted).
An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the
other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the
performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be an agent.
Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 2(3) (1958) (emphasis added). See also Jones v.
HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 113,206 P.3d 473,477 (2009)
(finding a hospital may be held liable for the actions of an independent contractor vested
with apparent authority).
1 While

the Webb Affidavit states that Kaufman was an independent contractor, Webb
does not make any mention of Kaufman's status as an agent.
BENCH MEMORANDUM RE: KAUFMAN'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 4
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Whether or not Kaufman is an independent contractor does not determine the
question of whether she was Anytime Fitness's agent. Even if Kaufman were an
independent contractor, it would not determine her status as an agent.
b. The membership agreement is a valid contract, under which Nelson
waived liability of Anytime Fitness's agents.

Nelson next argues that apparent authority 2 cannot be applied to protect an
independent contractor from liability, but can only be used to hold a principal liable when
an independent contractor acts on his behalf. The only authority Nelson cites in support
of this argument is Restatement (Third) of Agency§ 2.03.
Section 2.03 of the Restatement, on which Nelson relies, states:
Apparent authority is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a
principal's legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably
believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that
belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations.
Restatement (Third) Of Agency§ 2.03 (2006).
The language of§ 2.03 of the Restatement, defining apparent authority, does not
support Nelson's interpretation that the doctrine of agency may only be used to hold a
principal liable. Under the plain language of the membership agreement, Nelson waived
the liability of Anytime Fitness's agents. Nothing in§ 2.03 addresses or precludes a
contractual waiver of liability. "Agreements exempting a party from liability for
negligence will be upheld unless the party owes to the other party a public duty created
by statute or the other party is at an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power."

2

Nelson raises this argument only as it pertains to apparent authority. In its previous
order granting summary judgment in favor of Kaufman, this Court held that Kaufman had
both actual/express authority and apparent authority to act as Anytime Fitness's agent in
instructing the circuits class.
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Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene Univ., 152 Idaho 660,661,273 P.3d 1253, 1254 (2012),
citing Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976,978,695 P.2d 361,363 (1984).
c. Given the undisputed facts, the determination of agency was a question of
law for this Court to decide.

Nelson next argues that the existence of an agency relationship is a question of
fact that should not have been decided by this Court on summary judgment. Nelson
quotes:
"This Court has previously viewed the question of whether an agency
relationship exists as a question of fact for the jury to determine." Id. at
735 n.2, 366 P.3d at 1095 n.2. But, to be clear, "[w]hether facts sufficient
to constitute an agency relationship exist is indeed a question of fact for
the jury, however, whether a given set offacts are sufficient to constitute
an agency relationship is a question of law appropriate for this Court's
consideration." Id.
Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317,396 P.3d

1199, 1212 (2017) (emphasis added). Nelson emphasizes the first sentence, above, but
does not address the application of the second sentence to this case. The facts upon
which this Court relied to determine the existence of an agency relationship between
Kaufman and Anytime Fitness were not disputed.
An agent is a person who has been authorized to act on behalf of a
principal towards the performance of a specific task or series of
tasks. Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 151, 124 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2005).
An agency relationship is created through the actions of the principal who
either: (1) expressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions
on his or her behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct
certain actions which are necessary to complete those actions that were
expressly authorized; or (3) apparently grants the agent authority to act
through conduct towards a third party indicating that express or implied
authority has been granted. Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d
900, 902 (1985). Agency relationships are limited in scope to the express,
implied, and apparent authority granted by the principal. Only acts by the
agent that are within the scope of the agency relationship affect the
principal's legal liability. Restatement (Third) of Agency§ 1.01 (Am. Law
Inst. 2006).
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Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735-36, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095-96 (2016), reh'g
denied (Feb. 23, 2016) (note omitted).
i. Express Authority

Express authority is the authority that a principal has explicitly granted to
the agent to act in the principal's name.

Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has
explicitly granted the agent to act in the principal's name.

Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497-98, 708 P.2d 900, 902--03 (1985)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Am. W Enterprises, Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746, 753-54, 316 P.3d 662, 669-70
(2013).
The declarations of an alleged agent, standing alone, are insufficient to
prove that the principal has conferred such authority. Clark v. Gneiting, 95
Idaho 10, 501 P.2d 278 (1972). However, the authority of the agent to act
for and on behalf of his principal does not have to be established by direct
or positive proof, but may be inferred from dealings, circumstances, acts
and conduct. White v. Doney, 82 Idaho 217, 221, 351 P.2d 380, 382
(1960).

Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497,500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Ct. App. 1989).
The following undisputed evidence supports this Court's conclusion that
Kaufman had express or actual authority to act as Anytime Fitness's agent: (1) Anytime
Fitness manager asked Kaufman to teach the circuit class, Kaufman Aff. ,r 2; (2) Anytime
Fitness paid Kaufman to teach the class, id. ,i 4; (3) Anytime Fitness had posted a notice
at its Idaho Falls location that a circuit class would be taught there, Nelson Aff. ,r 2; (4)
"The notice was clear that those participating in that activity ... would be working with a
trainer selected by Anytime Fitness." Id. ,i 3; (5) Anytime Fitness had posted a flyer at its
Idaho Falls location with Kaufman's picture, stating that Kaufman "was a personal
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trainer at Anytime Fitness," id. 14; (6) Anytime Fitness had arranged for Kaufman to
teach the circuit class, id. 15; (7) when Nelson showed up for the circuit class, the
Anytime Fitness office manager told her she would inform the teacher of her presence;
Kaufman arrived within a few minutes, id. 11 7-11 ; and (8) payment for the circuit class
was included with Nelson's Anytime Fitness membership, id. 125. These facts are not in
dispute.
The above listed items indicate Anytime Fitness gave Kaufman authority to teach
the circuit class on its behalf. These acts establish, as a matter of law, Anytime Fitness
expressly authorized Kaufman to act as its agent.
ii. Apparent Authority

Apparent authority differs from actual authority. It is created when
the principal voluntarily places an agent in such a position that a
person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business usages
and the nature of a particular business, is justified in believing that
the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority. Apparent
authority cannot be created by the acts and statements of the agent
alone.
Am. W Enterprises, Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746, 753-54, 316 P.3d 662, 669-70

(2013) (quoting Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497-98, 708 P.2d 900, 902-03 (1985)
(internal citations and quotations omitted)).
Even if the uncontroverted facts cited above did not support a conclusion that
Anytime Fitness had granted Kaufman express authority, they would support this Court's
determination that Anytime Fitness granted Kaufman apparent authority to act as its
agent in teaching the circuit class.
iii. Scope of Authority

Finally, Nelson argues that Kaufman could not be Anytime Fitness's agent
because there is no evidence "Kaufman had any legal authority to act for, contract for,
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order inventory for, or otherwise perform any of the duties given to a legal agent." P's
Second Br. in Support ofM. to Reconsider at 4-5.
"Agency relationships are limited in scope to the express, implied, and apparent
authority granted by the principal." Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366 P.3d
1088, 1095 (2016), reh'g denied (Feb. 23, 2016).
The undisputed facts establish Kaufman was an agent of Anytime Fitness in the
capacity of a class instructor. There is nothing in the record that would indicate the scope
of Kaufman's agency as a class instructor required authority for Kaufman to contract on
behalf of Anytime Fitness or to order inventory on behalf of Anytime Fitness.
Consequently, such evidence is irrelevant to Kaufman's actual authority to lead a circuit
class on behalf of Anytime Fitness.

III. CONCLUSION
Nelson's motion to reconsider should be denied.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Case No. CV16-1618
Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO RECONSIDER

vs.
STEFANIKAUFMAN,ANYTIME
FITNESS, and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendants.

This matter having come before the Court for hearing on February 28, 2018, on Plaintiffs
Motion to Reconsider, and good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ~ day of March, 2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Jeffrey A. Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
Elam& Burke
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

-4- U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
_ _ Via Facsimile- (208) 542-2711
~U.S.Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
_ _ Via Facsimile-(208) 384-5844

Deputy Clerk
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Allen H. Browning, ISB#3007
Steve Carpenter, ISB#9132
BROWNING LAW
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Telephone: (208) 542-2700
Facsimile: (208) 542-2711
Email: allen.browning.law@gmail.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No.: CV-16-1618
NOTICE OF APPEAL

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME FITNESS,
and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Respondent.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT(S), STEFANI KAUFMAN AND ANYTIME
FITNESS AND AT FITNESS, LLC AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS JEFFREY THOMSON
AND JOSEPH SOUTHERS,P.O. BOX 1539, BOISE,IDAHO 83701 ANDTHECLERKOFTHE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT BONNEVILLE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellant Amey Nelson appeals against the above named
respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from Decision and Order Re: Motion to
Reconsider entered in the above entitled action on the 15th day of March, 2018,
Honorable Judge Dane H. Watkins Jr. presiding, as well as the decision and Order of the
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Court dated November 28, 2017 and Judgment dated November 28, 2017 dismissing the
above captioned case.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule
1 l(a)(l), I.A.R.

3.

The issue on appeal is: that summary judgment was erroneously granted where facts
supported the Plaintiff's case, summary judgment was granted prematurely, the burden of
proof was erroneously shifted to Plaintiff, and evidence was erroneously construed in
favor of the moving party.

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No.

5.

(a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes.
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript in D hard copy D electronic format

X both

The reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(c), I.AR.
The Appellant requests transcripts of the following hearings, with Court Reporter
Amy Bland: Defendant's motion for summary judgment on November 2nd, 2017,
Plaintiff's motion to reconsider on February 28th , 2018.
6.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.:
1. Defendant Stefani Kaufman's motion for summary judgment, 9/11/2017;

2. Memorandum in support of Defendant Stefani Kaufman's motion for summary
judgment, 9/11/2017;
3. Affidavit of Stefani Kaufman in support of motion for summary judgment, 9/11/2017
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4. Plaintiff's brief in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment including
attached exhibits, 10/19/2017;
5. Affidavit ofKaecee Reed, 10/19/2018;
6. Second Affidavit ofKaecee Reed, 10/26/2018;
7. Reply memorandum in support of defendant Stefani Kaufman's motion for summary
judgment, 10/26/2017;
8. Plaintiff's motion to reconsider, 11/17/2017;
9. Plaintiff's brief in support of motion to reconsider, 11/17/2017;
10. Court's Order of dismissal with prejudice, 11/28/2017;
11. Judgment entered on 11/28/2017;
12. Memorandum in response to plaintiff's brief in support of motion to reconsider,
12/07/2017;
13. Plaintiff's Second Brief in support of Motion to Reconsider, 02/22/2018;
14. Bench Memorandum RE: Kaufman's motion to reconsider, 3.6.2018;
15. Order denying Plaintiff's motion to reconsider, 3/15/2017.

7.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on Court Reporter Amy
Bland.

(b)

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript ($200.00)

(c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record ($100)
has been paid.
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(d)

That the appellate filing fee ($129.00) has been paid.

(e)

That the service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2018.

len Browning
Attorneys for the Appellant
Amey Nelson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this day I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in
accordance with Rule 5(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure on the following by the method of
service indicated:
Bonneville County Courts
Attn: Judge Dane H. Watkins
605 N Capital Ave
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

US MAIL
_FAX(208)529-1122
HAND DELIVERY
~ COURTHOUSE

Amy Bland
Court Reporter - Bonneville County
605 N Capital Ave
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402

US MAIL
FAX
HAND DELIVERY
.){._ COURTHOUSE BOX

Jeffrey A Thomson
Joseph F. Southers
ELAM & BURKE, PA
251 East Front Street Ste. 300
PO BOX 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701

X

US MAIL
_FAX (208)384-5844
HAND DELIVERY
COURTHOUSE BOX
_ EMAIL (jat@elamburke.com;
jfs@elamburke.com)

DATED this 23 rd day of April, 2018.

Linda Call
Legal Assistant
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Attorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

AMEY J. NELSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. CV16-1618
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR
ADDITION AL CLERK'S RECORD

STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
FITNESS , and AT FITNESS, LLC,
Defendant/Respondent.

TO:
THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Stefani Kaufman requests, pursuant to Rule 19(c),
I.A.R., the inclusion of the following materials in the clerk's record in addition to that required to
be included by the I.AR. and identified in the notice of appeal:
l.

Clerk's Record:
A.

Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed
September 11, 2017;

B.

Defendant Stefani Kaufman's Motion to Strike the Exhibits to the
Affidavit of Kaecee Reed and Certain Statements in Plaintiffs Brief in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed October 26, 2017;
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2.

05 - 08-201 8

C.

Memorandum in Support of Defendant Stefani Kaufman 's Motion to
Strike the Exhibits to the Affidavit of Kaecee Reed and Certain Statements
in Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed
October 26, 2017;

D.

Defendant Stefani Kaufman's Motion to Strike the Second Affidavit of
Kaecee Reed filed October 30, 2017; and

E.

Memorandum in Support of Defendant Stefani Kaufman's Motion to
Strike Second Affidavit of Kaecee Reed filed October 30, 2017.
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I certify that a copy of this request was served upon the Clerk of the District Court

and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20.
DATED this

f3

day of May, 2018.
.A.

By:
re A. Thomson, Of the firm
·' ttorneys for Defendant Stefani Kaufman
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of May, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served as follows:
Allen H. Browning
Browning Law
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Attorneys for Plaintiff

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
___,rfederal Express
__
./ 'v
Via Facsimile - (208) 542-2711

4832-6780-1189 , V. 1
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Amy L. Bland, CSR, RPR
Official Court Reporter
Seventh Judicial District
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
(208) 529-1350 Ext 1329
E-mail: abland@co.bonneville.id.us

**************************************************************
NOTICE OF LODGING

**************************************************************
DATE:

July 11, 2018

TO:

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court I Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO: 46027
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO:
CAPTION OF CASE:

CV-2016-1618

Amey Nelson vs. Stefani Kaufman, Anytime
Fitness, and AT Fitness, LLC

You are hereby notified that a reporter's appellate
transcript in the above-entitled and numbered case has been
lodged with the District Court Clerk of the County of Bingham
in the Seventh Judicial District. Said transcript consists of
the following proceedings, totaling 82 pages:
1.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing
(November 2, 2017)

2.

Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Hearing
(February 28, 2018)

Respectfully,
AMYL. BLAND
Idaho CSR #SRL-1053
cc:

District Court Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J. NELSON,

)
)
Plaintiff/Appellant,
)
)
v.
)
)
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
)
FITNESS, and, AT FITNESS, LLC,
)
)
______
D_efi_e_n_dan_t/R_e~sp._o_n_d_en_t_ _ )
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

Case No. CV-2016-1618
Docket No.

46027

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)
)

I, Penny Manning, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true,
correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will
be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript
(if requested) and the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District
Court this _l_day of August, 2018.
PENNY MANNING
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J. NELSON,

)
)
Plaintiff/Appellant,
)
)
V.
)
)
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
)
FITNESS, and, AT FITNESS, LLC,
)
)
_ _ _ _ _ _D_e:6_e_n_dan_t/R_e.....sp._o_n_d_en_t_ _ )
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

Case No. CV-2016-1618
Docket No.

46027

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION
OF EXHIBITS

)
)
)

I, Penny Manning, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were
marked for identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the
Court in its determination:

No exhibits were admitted.
And I further certify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this
record on Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
District Court this

_la_ day of August, 2018.
PENNY MANNING

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS -1

154

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
AMEY J. NELSON,

)
)
Plaintiff/Appellant,
)
)
v.
)
)
STEFANI KAUFMAN, ANYTIME
)
FITNESS, and, AT FITNESS, LLC,
)
)
_ _ _ _ _ _Defi_e_n_dan_t/R_e~spL...o_n_d_en_t
_
__ )

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

Case No. CV-2016-1618
Docket No.

46027

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

-1z___ day of August, 2018, I served a copy of the

Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in
the above entitled cause upon the following attorneys:
Allen Browning
482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

Jeffrey A. Thomson
Joseph Southers
251 East Front Street Suite 300
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope
addressed to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys
known tome.

PENNY MANNING
Clerk of the District Court
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